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1.  Introduction 
In the last few years, issues related to international migration are receiving increasing attention 
from policy makers. This reflects mainly the changes in the magnitude and composition of 
migration flows. Net migration into the EU has risen again during the period 1998 to 2003. With 
an overall level of around 4 per thousand, relative immigration levels into the EU appear to be at 
present somewhat higher than those into the US (3.3 per thousand). High irregular migration, 
with estimates of the relation between regular and irregular immigration running between 1:0,3 
and 1:1, and high numbers of asylum applicants indicate an increase in migration pressure during 
the last decade. Major changes in the source and destination of migrants have also taken place: 
traditional receiving countries have lost prominence while Southern European countries, who 
were sending countries until fairly recently, have become receiving countries, and some Eastern 
European Member States are now both sending and receiving migrants.  
Still, it is not straightforward to answer questions such as what is the size of the immigrant 
population, how many of them are labour migrants, what their skills are and how do successive 
cohorts perform in their host countries. The data generally available do not provide a clear idea 
about the number of immigrants across countries, mainly because countries have different 
concepts of who is an immigrant depending on whether migration is temporary or permanent, or 
whether immigrants are considered to be foreigners or foreign-born people who have immigrated 
into their country of residence at a point in their lives. When the criterion used is nationality, 
immigrants who are naturalised cease to be counted and they become difficult to distinguish from 
the majority of native citizens. Moreover, the people born in a country, such as the children and 
grand-children of immigrants, do not always acquire that country's nationality. 
Using foreign country of birth has several advantages: first, it conforms to the international 
standard definition of immigrant, second, it is not affected by return migration of those who lived 
abroad and come back to their home country (who are counted as immigrants if the variable used 
is "previous foreign country of residence") and, third, it is not affected by naturalisation. From a 
European perspective, it is appropriate to further distinguish nationals from other Member States, 
for whom free movement within the EU is in place, from third country nationals, subject to the 
immigration and asylum legislations of each Member State. In most Member States, over 20% of 
immigration flows currently originate from another Member State and over 15% are nationals 
returning from abroad.  
A Community immigration and asylum agenda is under development under the area of 
freedom, security and justice created by the treaty of Maastricht of 1991/93. Immigration and 
asylum of third-country nationals was inserted in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997/99 (Title 
IV). The European Council, at its meeting in Tampere in October 1999, provided an important 
input and agreed that «the (…) issues of asylum and migration call for the development of a 
common EU policy». It also stressed the assessment of the economic and demographic 
developments within the Union, as well as the situation in the countries of origin, as a basis for 
decisions on «the approximation of national legislations on the conditions for admission and 
residence of third country nationals».
1  
In November 2000, the Commission published a Communication on a Community Immigration 
Policy
2 in which it recognised that immigration has an important role to play in increasing 
                                                 
1        In 1994, a European Council Resolution prescribed that "Member States will refuse entry to their territories of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of employment", see Council Resolution of 20 June 1994 on the limitation of admission of third-country nationals to the territory of 
the Member States for Employment.  
2   COM(2000) 757.   4
Europe’s growth potential and realising the goals of the Lisbon Strategy more generally. In 
addition, it notes a growing recognition that the «zero» immigration policies of the past 30 
years are no longer appropriate and that channels for legal immigration to the Union should be 
made available for labour migrants. In its Communication of June 2003 on Immigration, 
Integration and Employment
3, the Commission explored the role of immigration in the context 
of demographic ageing and outlined policy orientations and priorities to promote the integration 
of immigrants. The Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 welcomed this 
Communication and stressed «the need to explore legal means for third country nationals to 
migrate to the Union, taking into account the reception capacities of the Member States». As a 
follow-up, the Commission adopted its first Annual Report on Migration and Integration in 
June 2004, where it announced its intention to work towards the definition of common basic 
principles for integration at EU level. It has commissioned a number of studies on this topic
4 
and reported on the labour market situation of immigrants in 2003 and 2004.
5  
The European Council adopted the Hague Programme in November 2004, which sets out an EU 
work programme for 2005-10 in the field of justice, freedom and security. It asked the 
Commission to formulate a policy plan on legal migration, including issues such as admission 
procedures that can respond promptly to fluctuating demands for migrant labour. In response, 
the Commission first issued a Green Paper
6 on how to manage economic migration at EU level, 
in January 2005. The Green Paper launched a wide consultation on which rules should be 
proposed and adopted at EU level concerning the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for economic reasons.
 Second, the Commission proposed a Policy Plan on 
legal migration in December 2005. The later events in Ceuta and Melilla and the situation in 
Lampedusa and Malta, as well as in the Canary Islands and some Greek Islands, reinforce the 
need for a common and integrated approach to address the international flows of people, taking 
into account both migration and development policies. 
Economists can advise the debate on migration, as a growing body of literature examines the 
characteristics of migrants, their economic integration and the consequences of their migration on 
both sending and receiving countries. Work on the determinants of migration flows also shows 
how migration is driven by economic and demographic factors and by policy. This note focuses 
on several economic aspects of immigration. It first reviews recent trends and patterns in 
migration to the EU; it then turns to examining the economic impact of migration, in particular 
the overall gains and pains from immigration and the labour market consequences for receiving 
countries; finally, it discusses some factual policy approaches. 
2.  Characterising migration in the EU 
2.1  Recent trends in migration 
2.1.1 Flows and stocks of immigrants 
From an historical perspective, immigration to Europe is a relatively new phenomenon. Most 
European countries have been countries of emigration, some of them until fairly recently. The 
second half of the 19
th century was an era of mass emigration from Europe: over 50 million 
people emigrated to the US, Canada and South America between 1820 and 1914. Initially, 
                                                 
3  COM (2003) 336 final. 
4   See the studies commissioned by the European Commission Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 
in particular, Münz (2004), Münz and Fassmann (2004) and Boswell et al (2004). 
5   See European Commission (2003) and European Commission (2004).  
6          COM (2004) 811 final   5
migrants mainly originated from Britain, they were joined by a stream of emigrants from 
Germany in mid-century and then from Scandinavia and other parts of north-western Europe. 
Finally, a large wave of migration from Southern and Eastern Europe started in the 1880s. 
European emigration declined after 1914, as part of the general reverse in globalisation during 
the interwar period (Hatton and Williamson, 2003; O'Rourke, 2004). Renewed prominence of 
migration within Europe can explain part of this drop.  
European countries have gradually become a destination for migrants, starting in the 1950s in 
countries with post-war labour recruitment needs and with colonial past. Southern countries 
became receiving countries during the 1990s and several countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe are currently both source and origin of migrants. Three distinct phases of immigration 





Graph 1:  
-  the guest worker phase, with programmes to recruit foreign workers to cope with 
increasing labour demand during the economic boom in the 1950s and 1960s in Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Luxemburg, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the UK. They 
turned to other European countries, such as Italy, Portugal and Spain, and/or to former 
colonies or neighbouring countries: North Africa in the case of France and Belgium; the 
Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent for the UK; and Yugoslavia and Turkey for 
Germany. Foreign labour recruitment stopped in 1974, after the first oil price shock and 
subsequent rise in unemployment;
7 
-  immigration continued, mostly due to family reunification: net migration flows during 
the 1970s were of 240,000 people per year on average as immigrants who were present 
in these countries decided to stay and were joined by their families from their home 
countries;  
-  the asylum seekers phase, after a brief period of net outflows during the early 1980s 
recession. Net migration flows rose again, peaking in 1991-1992, as the fall of the "iron 
curtain" and a number of wars and ethnic conflicts, such as in former Yugoslavia, 
pushed upwards the number of people seeking asylum. Net inflows dropped 
significantly between 1992 and 1997, partly due to tighter controls over migratory flows 
in the main receiving countries, but they resumed their growth at the end of the 1990s. 
Overall, the average annual net entries for the EU25 more than tripled from around 
198,000 people per year during the 1980s to around 750,000 people per year during the 
1990s. High clandestine migration also marks the decade of the 1990s.  
Net inflows started rising at the end of the 1990s until 2003, from over 500,000 people in 1998 
to close to 2 million in 2003. Some of this increase, however, does not only reflect new entries 
of migrants, but also large-scale regularisation programmes which made parts of the migrant 
                                                 
7   Measures of macroeconomic conditions, such as unemployment rates, are typically not helpful in explaining long-run immigration policy 
changes; however the timing of their introduction is strongly influenced by short-run macroeconomic conditions (Hatton and Williamson, 
2004).   6
population residing illegally in the EU visible in official statistics. Net flows show a recent 
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Note:  Net migration is measured as the difference between the total population on 1 January and 31 December for a given calendar year, 
minus the difference between births and deaths (or natural increase).  
Source:  Eurostat, US Census/Office of Immigration Statistics. 
 
Key drivers of migration flows 
The economic theory of migration is based on the assumption that migrants try to maximise the net gains 
from migration, calculated as the difference in present value of alternative earnings streams, minus 
migration costs. An individual is more likely to migrate the higher is the wage in the destination country 
and the lower the source country wage and the migration cost. Policies that restrict immigration can be 
seen as raising the migration cost. The likelihood of migration tends to decline with age because the 
remaining working life is shorter. Thus, for a given incentive to migrate, migration will be higher the 
younger is the population of working-age in the source country. 
New economic theories have expanded this framework to incorporate the idea that migration decisions are 
taken in a household context rather than by an individual. The family member in a foreign labour market 
sends a stream of remittances to improve the economic situation of the family which can either stay in the 
country or follow via family reunification. 
Hatton and Williamson (2002) identify four main economic and demographic factors generating 
migration: 
-  the gap in income per capita between rich, high-wage countries and poor, low-wage countries;  
-  emigration from poor countries may increase as economic development takes place, which does 
not seem consistent with the fact that migration is driven by the gap between income in the source 
and destination regions. This is due to the relaxation of the poverty constraints to migrate. Indeed, 
for the very poor it may be difficult to finance migration so income gains have a positive effect on 
migration, which may dominate the negative effect associated with a reduction of the income gap 
between sending and receiving countries. A hump shaped relationship between economic   7
development in sending countries and emigration has been observed: emigration rates out of very 
poor countries are very low, whilst they are much higher out of moderately poor countries (Hatton 
and Williamson, 1998); this could be explained by catching up that relaxes the poverty constraint.  
-  the share of young adult population in a receiving country has a negative effect on immigration, 
whilst a bigger young adult share in sending countries increases emigration.  
-  networks (friends and relatives) drive dynamic effects of migration through the stock of previous 
migrants from the sending country residing in the receiving country. 
On the demand-side, the policies of receiving countries are factors of migration, notably the promotion of 
immigration to fill labour shortages.  
Net migration flows do not show the size of inward and outward movements due to temporary 
and return migration that are becoming much more common (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). 
Therefore, net migration flows tend to increase much slowly than gross flows. In particular, 
Germany, Denmark, Luxemburg and Sweden record a comparatively large number of arrivals, 
but the high number of outflows keeps net migration, as a share of total population, relatively 
low, see Table 1. Sinn et al. (2001) estimate that only 40 per cent of immigrants were still living 
in Germany 10 years after their arrival and less than 35 per cent after 25 years.
8 In Sweden, over 
a quarter of immigrants are estimated to leave within 5 years of their arrival (Edin, LaLonde and 
Aslund, 2000). 
Table 1  Gross migration flows relative to the total population, per thousands 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001
BE 4.8 6.3 6.2 7.6 5.5 3.3 0.4 4.1
CZ 4.4
DK 7.1 6.5 12.1 9.9 10.5 9.8 5.2 6.0 0.7 8.1 8.2
DE 6.6 20.9 10.7 5.5 7.7 7.4
EE
GR 3.4 4.2
ES 0.5 0.9 0.9 9.1 10.2 11.8 0.0
FR
IE 9.5 8.7 11.2 12.0 12.9 16.1 5.2
IT 1.5 2.9 1.7 4.0 3.7 1.5 1.0 0.1 1.0
CY 18.5 25.0 20.4 16.3 19.9
LV 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.5 2.8
LT 0.4 1.3 0.7 2.1
LU 18.0 27.1 25.4 27.1 27.6 27.2 1.4 18.7
HU 2.0 1.7 0.2
MT 1.2 1.2
NL 5.5 7.9 6.2 8.4 8.3 7.5 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.2 4.3
AT 10.2 11.2 8.1 9.1
PT 0.5 0.5 0.6
SI 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.8
SK 1.0
FI 2.0 2.6 2.3 3.1 3.5 3.4 1.6 1.3 1.8 2.9 2.7
SE 6.8 12.1 9.0 11.3 11.7 12.3 2.6 3.0 4.1 4.1 3.8
UK 27.8 31.3 27.8 41.1 3.1 4.1 3.4 4.9 4.4
Immigration Emigration
 
Note:  Gross flows do not add up to net flows in the statistics due to the different approaches to estimate the two types of flows. Gross 
immigration and emigration flows are derived from migration statistics. Net migration is estimated using population statistics, as the 
total population for a given calendar year, minus the natural increase, see Table 4. The approach is different from that of subtracting 




The stocks of migrants and the change in their composition reflect different migration waves over 
a long period of time. The proportion of foreigners in the total population has increased in most 
countries since the early 1990s. It shows wide cross-country differences: it is the highest in 
Luxemburg, close to 10 per cent in Austria, Germany and Belgium and around 5 per cent in most 
                                                 
8   These figures exclude “ethnic Germans” and asylum seekers.    8
other Member States except Italy, Finland and new Member States, where foreigners account for 
less than 3% of the population. Due to high recent inflows, the share of foreign population has 
sharply increased in Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland.  
Table 2 Foreign population and labour force 
Foreign labour force 
as a % of total labour 
force
1990 (1) 2004 (2) 1990 (1) 2004 (2) 2004 (2)
BE 881 871 8.9 8.4 8
DK 151 268 2.9 4.9 3.9
DE 5,343 6,739 6.7 8.2 9
GR 226 762 2.2 7 6.4
ES 398 1,977 14 . 6 9 . 3
FR 3,597 3,263 6.3 5.4 5.4
IRL 81 223 2.3 5.5 5.9
IT 490 1512 0.9 2.6 3.2
LU 106 177 27.9 39 45
NL 642 699 4.3 4.3 3.6
AT 518 777 6.6 9.5 8.4
PT 101 449 14 . 3 2 . 9
FI 21 108 0.4 2.1 1.5
SE 456 463 5.3 5.1 4.5
UK 2,416 2,857 4.3 4.8 5.4
CZ :2 5 4:2 . 5 0 . 7
HU  :1 4 2:1 . 4 0 . 7
SK  :2 2:0 . 4 :
EU15  15,426 23,836 5.1 7.7 8
in thousands




Note:  (1) A, D: data for 1991 
     (2) GR data refer to foreigners who entered Greece for employment purposes 
Source: OECD/Sopemi   
 
Information on the foreign-born gives a more accurate picture of the extent of migration. 
Recently, over 300,000 people per year have acquired the citizenship of a Member State of the 
EU15. In France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, the share of foreigners in the total 
population has not varied much during the 1990s, despite high inflows of foreign-born, partly 
reflecting a relatively high number of naturalisations. Data on the foreign-born population has 
recently become available from the OECD, for a limited number of years.
9 The foreign-born 
population accounts for close to 9 per cent of total population in the EU (for the countries for 
which data are available), a markedly low proportion as compared to 20 per cent of foreign-born 
population in Australia and Canada and 12 per cent in the US.
10 The percentage of the foreign-
born is generally higher than the percentage of foreigners, see Table 3. In many EU Member 
States, it approaches the levels observed in the US and using data on foreigners leads to a severe 
under estimation of the immigrant population. It is also important to note that the foreign-born 
population includes nationals from other EU Member States, see next section.  
                                                 
9  However, as some foreign-born people were born abroad with the citizenship of their country of current residence, they would normally not 
be considered as immigrants. This can be ignored in most countries without risk of distorting the picture of the immigrant population 
(Dumont and Lemaître, 2005). For Belgium and France, it is possible to exclude foreign-born citizens from the foreign-born population.  
10  The proportion of foreign born population is lower in the US relative to Australia and Canada. However, around 34 per cent of the US 
population belongs to an ethnic minority due to a past history of immigration (OECD, 2002).  
   9
Table 3 Percentages of foreign-born and non-citizens in the total population 
year
foreign-born non citizens
BE 2002 10,7 (9,3) 8,2
DK 2002 6,8 5
DE 1999-2002 12,5
GR 2001 10,3 7
ES 2001 5,3 3,8
FR 1999 10 (7,4) 5,6
IE 2002 10,4 5,9
LU 2001 32,6 36,9
NL 2001 10,1 4,2
AT 2001 12,5 8,8
PT 2001 6,3 2,2
FI 2000 2,5 1,7
SE 2003 12 5,3
UK 2001 8,3
CZ 2001 4,5 1,2
HU 2001 2,9 0,9
PL 2002 2,1 0,1
SK 2001 2,5 0,5
Percentage of
 
Note:  Figures in parentheses indicate the percentage of foreign-born in total population after excluding foreign-born citizens at birth. 
Source:  Dumont and Lemaître (2006). 
Migration statistics 
The principal sources of migration statistics are population registers, residence or work permits, censuses 
and, in some cases, surveys (household surveys and other surveys such as the International Passenger 
Survey). The main purpose of these sources is not the recording of migration flows or stocks. 
There is a significant lack of comparability in international migration statistics, stemming from various 
reasons:  
-  the use of different sources gives very different results; 
-    there are wide differences across countries about who is considered a migrant, whether the criteria 
used is nationality or country of birth;  
-  a migrant can be defined as a person obtaining the right of permanent or limited duration residence 
or as a person who registers in a population register and intends to stay for more than a specified 
period (which can vary from 3 months to one year). There are also differences in permit durations 
across countries for migration movements of the same type. Often, foreign students who enrol on 
a population register are counted as immigrants;  
-  the data on inflows are incomplete: illegal inflows are missing or underestimated;  
-  there is a lack of consistency between data on flows and stocks; 
-  there is a lack of meaningful data on emigration flows in many countries. 
A process of harmonisation of migration statistics is underway: Eurostat collects data on both migratory 
flows (immigration, emigration and net migration) and stocks (measured as non-national population). The 
information needs to be updated (the latest data available are for 2002). Progress to include more 
countries, notably Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey would also be necessary. The OECD (2005) presented 
the results of a new database on the immigrant stock, where statistics for foreign-born people are available 
by country of residence (of which 18 EU Member States) and country of birth (for 29 countries). The 
European Labour Force Survey (LFS) also allows distinguishing between foreign-born and native-born 
residents of the EU. Eurostat is currently designing an ad-hoc module in the 2008 LFS, focusing on 
immigrants and their immediate descendents. The survey could be used to estimate the stock of migrants 
and for integration purposes.   10
2.1.2 Destination and source countries of migration in the EU 
Traditionally, the largest number of arrivals was in Germany, France and the UK, but migration 
flows to Italy, Spain and Ireland have risen recently. During the period 1990 to 1996, Germany 
concentrated over half of the net migration flows into the EU. Over the period 1997 to 2003, the 
share of Germany as a recipient was 14%, with Spain receiving close to 30% of net inflows and 
the UK and Italy close to 15%. Since 2000, Spain receives the highest net inflows in the EU25, 
after recording net outflows during the 1960s and most of the 1970s and 1980s, see Table 4. 
Since 2000, net migration rates have turned positive in most EU10 new Member States, except in 
Latvia and Lithuania where the reverse pattern took place and Slovenia, where the net migration 
rate is positive since the 1960s. In 2005, the migratory balance was positive in all Member States 
except Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Netherlands. 
Table 4 Net migration rate, per thousands 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BE : 1.7 0.8 3.2 -3.4 2.5 -0.2 -0.1 2.0 0.2 1.3 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.2
CZ : : -11.1 0.4 -12.3 0.2 -4.0 0.2 -5.7 1.0 0.6 -4.2 1.2 2.5 1.8 3.5
DK : : -0.9 -0.4 4.3 -2.0 0.1 1.9 1.7 5.5 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.3 0.9 1.4
DE 8.8 1.2 2.2 4.3 -3.5 -2.7 3.9 0.9 8.3 4.9 2.0 3.3 2.7 1.7 1.0 1.2
EE : : 4.6 5.5 4.4 4.0 4.1 4.1 -3.6 -10.9 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.2 :
GR : : - 4 . 1 - 3 . 9 - 5 . 36 . 55 . 80 . 66 . 37 . 32 . 73 . 53 . 53 . 23 . 23 . 1
ES : : -4.7 -1.6 -1.5 0.4 3.0 -0.3 -0.5 1.8 9.7 10.8 15.7 14.9 14.3 15.0
FR : : 3.1 1.5 3.6 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.5 -0.3 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.7
IRL : : -14.8 -7.5 -0.9 5.4 -0.2 -11.1 -2.2 1.7 8.4 10.1 8.3 7.8 11.8 11.4
IT : : -1.9 -1.7 -2.0 0.4 0.1 -0.4 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.8 6.1 10.6 9.6 5.8
CY : : -12.9 -4.7 -1.5 7.4 0.6 2.0 16.4 10.1 5.7 6.6 9.7 17.2 21.2 27.2
LV : : 9.2 5.9 2.8 4.9 1.0 4.7 -4.9 -5.6 -2.3 -2.2 -0.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
LT : : 1.8 1.8 4.5 1.8 0.6 3.5 -2.4 -6.5 -5.8 -0.7 -0.6 -1.8 -2.8 -3.0
LU : : 1.9 5.4 3.2 9.8 3.7 2.5 10.5 10.5 8.0 7.6 5.7 4.7 3.4 3.4
HU : : 0.1 0.5 -0.2 -0.9 -0.7 -7.6 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.3 1.5 1.8 1.8
MT : : -21.7 -19.4 -6.3 6.2 2.5 0.0 2.3 -0.5 25.8 5.7 5.1 4.1 4.5 5.0
NL : : - 1 . 11 . 42 . 55 . 13 . 61 . 43 . 31 . 03 . 63 . 51 . 70 . 4- 0 . 6 - 1 . 2
AT : : -0.3 1.5 1.4 -3.2 1.2 0.8 7.6 0.3 2.2 5.4 4.3 4.7 7.6 7.4
PL : : -4.4 -3.2 -9.0 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -10.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3
PT : : -6.3 -19.5 -14.0 38.2 4.3 -1.9 -3.9 2.2 4.6 6.3 6.8 6.1 4.5 3.9
SI : : - 2 . 74 . 42 . 2 1 0 . 4 2 . 81 . 9- 0 . 20 . 41 . 42 . 51 . 11 . 80 . 93 . 6
SK : : 34.4 -1.6 -7.8 -0.7 -2.3 -0.6 -0.5 0.5 -4.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8
FI : : -2.1 -4.6 -7.9 -0.8 -0.5 0.5 1.7 0.8 0.5 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.7
SE : : - 0 . 14 . 25 . 82 . 01 . 21 . 34 . 11 . 32 . 83 . 23 . 53 . 22 . 82 . 7
UK : : 2.1 -0.8 -0.3 -0.8 -0.6 1.0 0.4 1.1 2.4 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.3
EU25 : : -0.2 0.0 -2.0 0.8 1.2 0.1 1.9 1.5 1.5 2.9 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.7
EU15 : : 0.1 0.2 -1.1 0.8 1.7 0.4 2.5 1.9 2.9 3.6 4.7 5.1 4.7 4.2
EU10 : : -1.4 -1.2 -6.3 0.4 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -0.4 -5.6 -0.6 0.1 0.5 0.5 -0.1  
Source: Eurostat 
On average over the second half of the 1990s, 18 per cent of people moving into an EU Member 
State were nationals from other Member States, 27 per cent were nationals returning from abroad 
and 54 per cent were nationals of non-EU countries.
11 Currently, the proportion of other EU15 
citizens in immigrant flows is very high in Luxemburg (close to 70 per cent), Belgium (40 per 
cent) and Ireland (30 per cent). In the other countries, the share of foreigners originating from 
other EU15 Member States is below 25 per cent. Returning nationals account for at least 15 per 
cent of inflows, reaching 35 per cent in Ireland and over 40 per cent in Denmark and Finland. 
Non-EU15 nationals account for between 25 per cent and 70 per cent of immigration flows, 
reaching 40% in Germany, 50% in Sweden, about 60% in Austria, the UK and the Czech 
Republic and over 75% in Spain and Slovenia. The main source countries of immigration in the 
EU15 in 2004 are Romania, Poland, Morocco, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine, Germany, the Russian 
Federation and the UK (OECD, 2006).  
The geography of migration flows is in constant evolution. Inflows have become more 
diversified, with increasing numbers of immigrants from new sources in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Asia (especially China), Africa and Central and Latin America (the latter mostly to 
Spain). Ukraine and the Russian Federation have appeared as major new source countries since 
                                                 
11   Eurostat; the data series is incomplete since 2000.   11
2000. There has also been a dispersion of flows of immigrants from the same country of origin 
into different destination countries. For example, nationals from the former Yugoslavia are long-
term residents in Germany and Austria and, more recently, Italy and Sweden. Nationals from 
Morocco first arrived to France, then Belgium and the Netherlands and more recently to Spain 
and Italy. Recent data indicate that migration flows from neighbouring countries have increased, 
notably from Romania to Hungary and Italy, from Poland and Turkey to Germany, from the 
Maghreb countries to France and from Germany to Switzerland and Austria (OECD, 2005).  
The relative size of flows by countries of origin has changed to a great extent since the early 
1990s. The proportion of immigrants from the traditional leading source of immigration has 
fallen in several countries, for example Russians and Estonians in Finland, Moroccans and Turks 
in the Netherlands and nationals of Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina have decreased 
in most countries. Some receiving countries have experienced a complete change in the main 
source of inflows. For example, in Denmark the top sending country in 2002 was Iraq. Two years 
later, Iraq was not among the top-ten, while the opposite was true for China.  
In most countries, the stock of foreign population originates from traditional immigration sources, 
reflecting historical ties. Movements between EU Member States continue to have a significant 
impact. Currently, the proportion of nationals from other EU15 Member States in the foreign 
population ranges from less than 5% in Italy and Greece to about 60% in Belgium and Ireland 
and 85% in Luxemburg. They account for 40% in Sweden, about 30% in Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Slovakia and the UK, and 15 to 20% in Spain, Poland and Denmark 
(OECD, 2006).  
In 2002-03, excluding nationals from other EU Member States, the largest groups of foreigners in 
Germany originate from Turkey and in the UK from Southeast Asia. In France and Belgium, the 
bigger groups of foreign citizens come from Northern Africa; in the Netherlands, they originate 
from Turkey and Africa; in Sweden and Finland they come from Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. In Spain and Portugal, the biggest group of foreign citizens originate 
from Latin America and Africa, respectively. In Italy, they come from Africa. US, Canadian and 
Australian nationals account for about 15% of the foreign population in Ireland and the UK. 
Some significant groups have emerged recently, such as Central and Eastern Europeans in 
Germany, Africans in the UK and Spain and Asians in the Nordic countries and Italy. Citizens 
from current EU-10 Member States and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe
12 make 
over 60 per cent of foreign residents in Greece, Austria and Finland. They account for around 20 
per cent in Denmark, Germany, Spain, Austria, Portugal and Sweden and for less than 8 per cent 
in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the UK.  
2.1.3 Types of migration  
Four broad types of migration flows can be distinguished:  
-  labour migration, including short- and long-term migrants and seasonal workers;
13 
students form a special sub-group, where it is unclear what proportion of them will enter 
the labour force of their host country during or after their studies;  
-  family-linked migration, both accompanying family members from the beginning and 
family unification; 
                                                 
12   The data include citizens of candidate countries, the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus and Central Asia.  
13   In traditional settlement countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US), people who are granted temporary residence may not 
figure in the statistics (OECD, 2005).   12
-  asylum seekers who, once they are granted asylum, are classified as refugees; and 
-  illegal immigrants, who may enter the country illegally, or stay after the expiration date in 
their visa or, having applied for asylum, stay in the country despite not having been 
granted refugee status.  
The distinction between these categories remains somewhat blurred, however, because the factors 
driving a migration decision can be numerous. Moreover, policy changes such as amendments to 
the conditions of entry and residence of immigrants, naturalisation decisions and regularisation of 
illegal immigrants affect the flows of entries and their composition. For example, the closing of 
labour migration and family reunification channels will put pressure on other forms of 
immigration, increasing the arrivals of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. A tightening up of 
measures aimed at asylum applicants may also lead to increased illegal immigration. 
Labour immigrants only constitute a fraction of total flows, in most Member States between 10 
and 35 per cent of the permanent immigrant flow in 2004, as a significant number of entrants 
arrive via family reunification or as asylum seekers, see Table 5. The proportion of entries for 
employment purpose is lowest in France and Sweden, at 10 to 15 per cent of total entries and the 
highest in Denmark and Portugal, where it exceeds 40%. About a half of permanent or long-term 
immigration flows into the EU arise from family reunification.
14 The main reason for entry by 
foreigners is family-linked: inflows in 2004 account for close to 40 per cent of the permanent 
immigrant flow in the UK, Denmark, Germany and Portugal and between 50 and 70% in the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland, France, Italy and Sweden.
15 Entries for humanitarian reasons 
account for between 2 per cent and 23%. Between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, the number 
of asylum applications in today's EU increased twenty-fold, from about 15,000 per annum to 
more than 300,000 per annum (Hatton, 2004). More recently, the flows in asylum seekers have 
diminished in some Member States.  
Table 5    Distribution of long-term migration inflows by type, in percentage, 2004 
Work Family Humanitarian Other
(including (including 
accompanying accompanying
 family)  family)
DK 43.6 39.7 9.4 7.3
DE 19.1 44.7 7.0 29.2
FR 11.9 64.3 6.5 17.3
IT 31.9 61.7 2.0 4.4
NL 27.5 49.8 22.8 :
AT 20.5 63.5 13.6 2.4
PT 56.7 36.2 : 7.1
FI 34.1 52.1 9.1 4.7
SE 17.1 67.8 15.1 :
UK 35.5 37.8 18.9 7.7   
Note:  The data concern foreigners. 
Source: OECD/Sopemi,  2006 
 
 
                                                 
14   Brücker (2001). This is also the case in the US, where family migration accounted for about 75% of permanent migration in 2004 (OECD, 
2006). 
15   OECD (2006).   13
Inflows of workers have increased in most countries since the second half of the 1990s. Their 
growth was fastest in Denmark, the UK and Sweden, where they rose by over 20 per cent, 
reflecting the strong economic growth and the shortage of skilled and highly skilled workers in 
some sectors, especially in the information technology sector.  
The asylum-seeker flow increased continuously after 1989, more markedly in Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and the UK. The UK, France and Germany receive the 
highest number of applications. The trend reversed in 2001-2002 and inflows declined in all 
EU15 countries except Greece. The top source countries of asylum seekers in the EU since 1995 
are Serbia and Montenegro, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan. Since 2003, the Russian Federation 
accounts for the largest group with over 30,600 applications filed in EU15 countries. However, 
many asylum seekers are not given refugee status; in the UK for example, two-thirds of 
applications are refused. Asylum seekers account for about 15 to 20 per cent of total immigration 
flows in the Netherlands, the UK, Sweden and Austria and for less than 10 per cent in Denmark, 
France, Finland, Germany and Italy (OECD, 2006). 
Estimates based on the responses to regularisation programmes and other assessment efforts have 
produced ratios between legal and illegal immigration in Europe in the range of 1:0.3 up to 1:1. 
Moreover, short-term temporary gross flows (both in and out) of clandestine immigrants may be 
even higher. Thus, there can be little doubt that significant stocks of irregular foreign residents 
may have built up over time which, in particular when clustered locally, add to serious concerns. 
According to estimates reported by Ghosh (2000), the proportion of irregular flows in total 
immigration is higher in Western Europe, at a third of total flows, than in the US, where it 
accounts for a fourth of total yearly flows. 
Regularisation 
Some 500,000 undocumented migrants are estimated to arrive in Europe each year (IOM, 2006). Four 
main waves of regularisation have occurred in Europe, in the 1980s, in the early and late 1990s and in 
early 2000. In total, around 3,719,200 regularisations occurred during the period, but the 4
th wave has been 
the largest, with 2,151,100 migrants regularised in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Number of regularisations, in thousands 
1981-88 1990-93 1996-98 2000-05 total
FR 121.1 77.8 198.9
GR 371 351 722
IT 118.7 217.7 461.6 634.7 1432.7
PT 39.2 21.8 182.2 243.2
ES 43.8 110.1 21.3 947.2 1122.4
total 283.6 367 953.5 2115.1 3719.2
US 405 400 805  
Source: OECD/Sopemi, 2006 
The composition of non-EU nationals by gender, age and education level varies across countries 
and also within countries from that of nationals. In France, Belgium and, to a lesser extent, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, the age structure of foreigners is relatively close to that of nationals, 
except that the share of people aged 65 and above is still lower for foreigners than for nationals. 
In Southern European countries and Finland, which are more recent receiving countries, as well 
as in the UK, the proportion of working-age people is higher for foreigners than for nationals and   14
the older-age groups are under-represented in the foreign population relative to the national 
population. 
Female migration inflows are typically associated with family reunification, but comparatively high 
percentages of women in the foreign population are found in the UK and the Nordic countries, 
where the relative proportion of refugees and asylum seekers is high and employment-related 
movements often involve women, especially in the health care sector. Whereas women used to be 
under-represented in the immigrant population, their proportion in the total foreign-born population 
in 2004 is higher than that of men in most EU15 countries.  
Overall, the EU tends to attract immigrants in largest proportion among the less educated: the 
distribution of foreign-born by education attainment tends to concentrate in the lower levels, 
whereas for nationals the proportion of the adult population with upper secondary attainment tends 
to be the highest, see Table 6. This partly reflects past labour demand for low skilled workers in the 
manufacturing sector. The proportion of foreigners with tertiary education level tends to be similar 
or higher than that of nationals, except in Belgium, Germany, France, Finland and Austria.  
Table 6  Distribution of foreign and national population aged 25 to 64 years, by level of education, 
2002-2003 
Foreigners Nationals Foreigners Nationals Foreigners Nationals
BE 52.3 37.8 25.7 33.5 22 28.7
DK 30.7 27.6 41.7 46.7 27.5 25.7
DE 47.1 13.6 38.2 62.4 14.7 24
GR 42.1 46.8 40.9 35.3 17 17.9
ES 43.3 58.3 28.5 17.2 28.2 24.6
FR 63.9 33.5 20.6 42.5 15.5 23.9
IRL 21.3 40.1 28.6 35.4 50.1 24.5
LU 43.8 27.5 38 56.7 18.2 15.8
NL 43.7 31.9 31.5 43.3 24.8 24.9
AT 42.9 19.3 43.4 63.7 13.7 17
PT 55.4 79.1 28.1 11.1 16.6 9.8
FI 29.1 24.8 46 42.4 24.9 32.8
SE 23.7 18 45.4 55.5 30.9 26.5
UK 30.9 17.4 25.5 53.1 43.6 26.2
CZ 25.9 11.7 52.5 76.6 21.5 11.7
HU  20.2 27.4 52.6 58 27.2 14.5
SK  13.2 13.8 67.8 75 19 11.2
Less than upper secondary Upper secondary Tertiary level
 
Note:  For DK and NL 2002 data. 
7.4%, 13%, 6% and 43.4% of the foreign population did not respond to the question on education attainment in Germany, Ireland, Sweden 
and the UK respectively. 
Source: OECD/Sopemi,  2005 
Overall, most international migrants are medium and low skilled people (OECD, 2005b). Peri 
(2005) finds that the immigrant population in the US, Canada, Australia and Switzerland has an 
educational distribution that is complementary to that of the native born. In contrast, the EU lags 
behind in its ability to attract skilled immigrants, with the exception of the UK.  
Over half of the highly-skilled from non-OECD countries go to the US. The US, the UK, France, 
Portugal and Spain seem best able to attract highly skilled workers from non-OECD countries, 
which can be explained by a colonial past and/or a linguistic advantage. In the EU as a whole,   15
mobility of the highly skilled primarily takes place within the EU, although traditional flows from 
North Africa and Central and Eastern Europe are significant.  
In 2002, the US hosted 79,000 foreign doctoral students, the largest number in the OECD 
(OECD, 2005b). The second major host is the UK (22,000 students). The share of foreign 
doctoral students in total enrolment exceeds a quarter in the UK and Belgium, a similar level as in 
the US. It is around 15 per cent in several EU Member States but hardly exceeds 5 per cent in 
Eastern Europe, Finland and Portugal. In the past 5 years, the number of international students 
has increased in most EU Member States, in particular in Spain. This increase is likely to 
continue in the near future, in particular in view of international study providing a potential 
gateway for entry into the labour market, notably in fields where there are labour shortages.  
Future net migration flows: assumptions underpinning the population projection made by Eurostat 
(EUROPOP2004) 
Eurostat projects net migration flows to fall from some 870,000 people in 2004 to about 800,000 until 
2010. Thereafter, net flows would remain around about 750,000 people until 2050. Over the period 2004 
to 2050, net migration to the EU25 would cumulate to 39.7 millions of people, of which the bulk would 
concentrate in the EU15 (37.1 millions), see Eurostat (2004).  
Net migration flows are projected to concentrate in a few destination countries: Germany (8.9 millions 
cumulated over 50 years), Spain (6.2 millions), Italy (5.8 millions) and the UK (4.9 millions). In the 
remaining EU15 countries, cumulated net flows are projected to range between 0.1 million in Luxembourg 
and 2.8 millions in France. According to the assumptions made by Eurostat, the recent change of Spain 
and Italy from origin to destination countries would be confirmed in coming decades, and similarly for 
Greece, albeit to a lesser extent with cumulated net flows of 1.7 million until 2050. In comparison, net 
migration flows to traditional destination countries such as France, Belgium, Luxemburg or the 
Netherlands would decrease in importance.  
Net migration into the EU10 is projected to turn positive in 2019, reaching 100,000 people in 2026 and 
remaining broadly constant thereafter. Hungary and the Czech Republic are projected to attract the bulk of 
migration flows to EU10 Member States (0.8 and 0.6 million respectively).  
2.1.4 EU enlargement 
Given that barriers to trade, foreign direct investment and other capital movements had already 
been largely removed prior to enlargement, the free movement of people and workers was 
probably the most significant dimension of economic integration to change after accession, 
compared to the status-quo. As of 1
st of May 2004, the movement of people within the enlarged 
EU is a matter of internal mobility.  
It goes without saying that any projection of east-west migratory flows following enlargement 
has been subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty, and analysis of developments thus far is 
hampered by data limitations. Certainly, the large gaps in per capita income and wages across the 
enlarged EU provide high incentives for east-west mobility, which are likely to persist for quite 
some time; furthermore, geographical proximity and established historical and cultural ties may 
ease migration flows.  
There have been more that thirty studies on the potential migration effects of enlargement with 
most estimating the long run migration potential to between 2-4% of the source populations. 
Cumulated over 15 years, the absolute net number of migrants has been estimated at around 3 
million people. This would correspond to about 1.2 percent of the projected working-age 
population of the former EU15 in 2020. The short-run annual impact under the assumption of a   16
completely unrestricted flow of workers was estimated at 300,000 to 350,000 in the first few 
years following enlargement (ECFIN, 2001; Boeri and Bruecker, 2003). 
Even allowing for a significant upward margin of error, these numbers are simply not large 
enough to affect the EU labour market in general. In summary, thus, these projections suggest 
that from an overall economic perspective, potential east-west net flows of labour following 
enlargement do not appear to pose any serious threat to jobs and wages in the EU as whole. 
However, assuming that migration streams from the EU-8 could flow along existing immigration 
networks and geographic distance, there were serious concerns that some countries and regions, 
in particular Austria and Germany, could face some short-run adjustment problems to cross-
border labour flows, including commuting, which were feared to cause labour market 
disturbances.   
As in previous enlargements, temporary arrangements with respect to labour mobility have been 
agreed upon and included in the accession treaties to ensure a smooth process of integration.
 The 
system of provisional arrangements combines a two-phased transition period of 5 years (with a 
review after 2 years) and a possibility for a prolongation for individual Member States, if 
requested, of a maximum period of 2 years. As a result, the "acquis communautaire" will be fully 
applied in all Member States after a maximum period of 7 years. 
However, the economic rationale for maintaining restrictions on the free movement of workers 
after the date of accession is weaker than often assumed in the popular debate. While the income 
gap between the new Member States and the EU15 is likely to diminish to some extent over the 
transition period, the basic incentives to migrate will – in all likelihood – not be fundamentally 
different from now. In any case, applying temporary curbs on labour mobility from the new 
Member States will only delay the overall movement of workers and, in the meantime, introduce 
“biased” destination patterns of the flows into the EU-15, with the risk to distort mobility even on 
a more permanent basis.
16  
Temporary restrictions on the free movement of labour could actually be in the interest of the 
new Member States, to avoid emigration and shortages of labour or wage push in a number of 
sectors. The departure of the population, mostly of working-age, from small new Member States 
reaches levels of 2 to 3 per cent of the population. Labour shortages in a number of sectors of the 
economy are reported in several EU10 Member States. Poland is easing the employment of non-
EU nationals to ease labour shortages. 
Transitional arrangements on the free movement of workers 
Free movement of people is one of the most fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law. It 
includes the right for EU nationals to move to another EU Member State to take up employment and to 
establish themselves in the host State with their family members. EU Member States are precluded 
from directly or indirectly discriminating against migrant workers and their families on the basis of 
their nationality. EU migrant workers and their families are entitled to equal treatment not only in 
employment related matters, but also as regards public housing, fiscal and social advantages. Removing 
barriers to mobility between and within Member States has also a central place in the Renewed Lisbon 
Agenda. 
The transitional arrangements (TA) set out in the Accession Treaty of 2003 allow for limited 
derogations from the principles set out in the preceding paragraph, during a transitional period which 
                                                 
16   Moreover, restrictions on legal work could actually lead to a proliferation of undocumented work, bogus "self-employed" work, and 
fictitious service provision and sub-contracting. 
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will irrevocably come to an end on 30 April 2011. The restrictions can only be applied to migrant 
workers, and not to other categories of EU citizens. Furthermore, restrictions can only apply to 
obtaining access to the labour market, and can only limit the eligibility for employment in a particular 
Member State. Once a worker has obtained access to the labour market of a particular Member State, 
Community law on equal treatment as regards remuneration, other employment related matters, and 
access to social and tax advantages applies. In other words, no discrimination whatsoever is allowed on 
the ground of nationality between legally employed workers, regardless of whether they come from 
EU15 or EU10 Member States. Further, there are no transitional arrangements for the application of 
Community law on the coordination of social security schemes.   
The transitional period is divided in three distinct phases, according to the "2-plus 3-plus 2 years" 
formula. Different conditions apply during each of these phases. The Accession Treaty provides that for 
the first two years of the TA, EU15 Member States will apply national measures, or those resulting 
from bilateral agreements, to regulate access to their labour markets by EU8 nationals. The diverse 
national measures taken during this first phase of the TA resulted in different legal regimes for access to 
the labour markets of the EU25. Sweden and Ireland decided not to apply restrictions on access to their 
labour markets by EU8 nationals. The UK had no ex-ante restrictions either, but has a Workers 
Registration Scheme. All other EU15 countries maintained a work permit regime, sometimes combined 
with quotas. No TA exists for Cyprus. Malta issues work permits for monitoring purposes. Poland, 
Slovenia and Hungary apply reciprocal restrictions to nationals from the EU15 Member States applying 
restrictions. All EU10 Member States have opened their labour markets to workers of EU10 Member 
States. 
The first phase of the transitional arrangements started on 1 May 2004 and ended on 30 April 2006. The 
Accession Treaty states that before the end of this phase, the Council shall review the functioning of the 
TA on the basis of a Commission report. On completion of this review, and no later than at the end of 
the two-year period following the date of accession, the EU15 Member States had to notify the 
Commission of their intentions with regard to the second phase of the TA. Those who wish to continue 
applying national measures are still allowed to do so. Four Member States (Greece, Portugal, Finland 
and Spain) have decided to lift restrictions for the second three-year phase of the transitional 
arrangements, while six others (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) 
have decided to alleviate them.  
As a general principle all national measures relating to labour market access should cease to apply by 
30 April 2009. Nevertheless, a Member State may continue applying national measures (subject to the 
notification procedure as above) for a maximum period of two further years, but only in case of serious 
disturbances of its labour market or a threat thereof. 
In any event, the Accession Treaty provides that Member States that decide to lift restrictions from 1 
May 2006 will have, throughout the remainder of the transitional period, the possibility to reintroduce 
restrictions using the safeguard procedure set out in the Accession Treaty, should they undergo or 
foresee disturbances on their labour markets. The Accession Treaty also lays down that, 
notwithstanding restrictions applied by Member States, they shall give preference to workers who are 
nationals of EU8 Member States over workers who are nationals of third countries as regards access to 
their labour market. 
Note:  Freedom of movement of workers (Art. 39 EC) must legally be distinguished from freedom of establishment (Art. 
43 EC) and freedom to provide services (Art. 49 EC). The posted workers’ Directive, which relates to the latter 
freedom, is not subject to transitional arrangements although Germany and Austria are allowed to apply restrictions 
on the cross-border provisions of services in certain sensitive sectors involving the temporary posting of workers. 
The posted workers’ Directive applies to undertakings established in a Member State which in the framework of 
the cross-border provision of services, post workers to work temporarily in a Member State other than the State in 
which they habitually carry out their work in performance of their contract. The Directive seeks to guarantee that 
posted workers enjoy, whatever the law applicable to the employment relationship, the application of certain 
minimum protective provisions in force in the Member State to which they are posted. To this end, Article 3(1) of 
the Directive provides that posted workers have to be guaranteed, during the period of posting, a number of terms 
and conditions of employment in force in the host Member State such as the minimum rates of pay, the maximum 
work periods and minimum rest periods and the rules regarding health, safety and hygiene at work.     18
Moreover, an important conclusion from both the studies on east-west migration potential and the 
developments so far is the need to differentiate between various types of migration, in particular 
distinguishing between short-term and more permanent movements. Available survey studies 
have suggested, for example, that the propensity for permanent emigration is fairly small for 
Czechs, Poles and Hungarians, while the preference for short-term migration, including cross-
border commuting, and seasonal and casual work is clearly much higher. Such patterns of 
"incomplete migration", with frequent short-duration trips abroad to earn a living while 
maintaining a home in the origin country, already existed before enlargement, in both legal and 
illegal forms.
17 They are eased by the rapid growth of low-fare air carriers. Thus, it is not 
implausible to assume that, following accession, incomplete migration will continue to be a more 
important type of east-west labour flows than conventional migration.
18 
Developments so far indeed broadly correspond to prior expectations; for a comprehensive 
analysis, see European Commission (2006) and ECAS (2006). On the whole, permanent 
migration remained low with the number of EU8 nationals residing in EU15 countries at only 
around 0.2% of the total EU15 population. Indeed, overall, the percentage of EU8 nationals in the 
resident population of each EU15 Member State was relatively stable before and after 
enlargement, with increases in the UK and, more conspicuously, in Austria and in Ireland.
19  
Yet, since enlargement there has been a significant increase in the number of EU8 citizens 
working in EU15 Member States. However, despite this increase, the relative impact, as 
measured by the number of permits issued for reason of employment as a proportion of the host 
country's working-age population, is rather limited. Furthermore, the number of resident and 
work permits issued at any point in time overestimates the actual number of EU8 nationals who 
have settled in the host country, because it does not take into account people returning to their 
countries of origin, i.e. the outflows, and the length of the work permits. The same is true in view 
of the fact that the data may reflect temporary factors such as regularisation of illegal migrants 
who have moved to EU15 Member States over several years.  
According to the Ministry of Labour in Poland, in the first year of Poland’s EU membership the 
volume of emigration amounted to 407,150, including 340,530 seasonal workers. The largest 
number of Poles, 250,000 people, worked in Germany. Some 15 per cent of the total number of 
Poles working abroad found employment in countries which fully opened their labour markets: 
10,000 in Ireland, 12,000 in Sweden and 40,000 in the UK. Overall, including short-term stays 
the UK registered some 450,000 workers from the new Member States in the first 26 months 
since May 2004, mainly from Poland and Lithuania; in Ireland, around 200,000 Social Security 
numbers were issued to people from the new member States.
20   
There is no evidence that migration flows from the EU8 have caused significant labour market 
disturbances in the EU15 countries. However, the emerging destination patterns lend some 
support to the view that mobility flows may have to some extent been “diverted” to countries 
with unrestricted access and highly absorptive labour markets such as Ireland and the UK. It may 
also be interesting to note that in most Member States the percentage of foreign nationals from 
                                                 
17  Salt et al. (1999) distinguish two types of so-called labour tourists: (a) short-term income-seeking workers, often without appropriate 
documents whose average stay is 2-4 months, estimated to number 600,000 to 700,000 annually (Morawska, 1999); and (b) a smaller 
group of contracted temporary workers, about 300,000 in number. 
18  A strong reduction in transport costs, with in particular low cost airline companies linking major Polish cities to UK, Ireland and 
Sweden, makes these migration patterns feasible even when the destination country is not in the immediate geographic vicinity of the 
country of origin. 
19   It should be acknowledged that even in countries maintaining transitory restrictions labour market access has not been completely 
blocked for workers from the new Member States; typically, access has been governed by some sort of a quota system.  
20   However, the Central Statistical Office reports that the total number of foreign nationals employed in Ireland in 2005 and the first 
quarter of 2006 was 198,000 of which just over 74,000 workers were from the new Member States.   19
non-EU countries is significantly higher than the one for EU nationals. This implies that 
migration from third countries is a much more important phenomenon than intra-EU mobility, 
both within the EU15 and the EU25. 



























Given the unique combination of long common borders with almost no geographical barriers and 
high permeability between countries with very different income levels, one might also envisage 
an upsurge in cross-border commuting, perhaps on a weekly or even longer-term basis. Indeed, 
combining the high wage levels in economies such as Austria or Germany with the low cost of 
living at the original place of residence may form a fairly attractive option for workers from the 
neighbouring Central and Easter European Countries (CEECs). It is fairly difficult, however, to 
project the potential cross-border commuting; in particular, historical experience offers little 
guidance, since earlier EU enlargements did not encompass the integration of high wage and low 
wage economies with such high population densities in the immediate vicinity. Existing estimates 
of the commuting potential between Austria and its CEECs neighbours, for example, put the 
numbers at between 40,000 up to 110,000 over the first five years, with some estimates as high as 
200,000 and above over a ten-year period. 
A related phenomenon, probably again particularly affecting border regions adjoining the 
CEECs, could be a significant increase in the cross-border provision of services, including 
construction, through posted workers or self-employed. Following the "Rush Portuguesa" 
judgement, the EC Directive 96/71/EC has introduced an obligation to uphold certain minimum 
wage and working conditions prevailing in the countries receiving temporarily posted workers. 
However, recent EU experience clearly suggests that legal enforcement may be difficult to 
achieve; but perhaps more important, even when the respective minimum requirements as regards 
wage rates and other employment conditions are honoured, the labour cost of posted workers may 
fall considerably short of the ongoing effective wages of native workers. 
Obviously, the likely types of east-west labour flows are intimately related to the personal 
profiles of the migrants. If the assertion is correct that labour flows will continue to be 
predominantly of the temporary, incomplete type, the majority of migrants can be expected to be 
young, single males, while family migration may be of somewhat less importance, at least in the 
initial years. However, concurrent with EU enlargement, about 1 million citizens of new EU 
members now lawfully residing in one of the old EU15 Member State have acquired the right to 
bring in dependent family members, representing a considerable potential for family   20
reunification. The same will be true for another 650,000 legal residents of Bulgarian, Romanian 
and also Croatian nationality after their accession. 
An important question concerns the skill distribution of migrants. In general, emigration is 
selective, in the sense that the better off move: the old adage that "migrants move from positions 
of strength" seems to be applicable. However, the jobs taken in destination countries are 
frequently of a lower qualification level than those left, with migrants going into construction, 
manufacturing and low skill service jobs. Morawska (1999), putting together evidence from 
various studies, suggests that 12 to 14 per cent of post-1989 westbound migration could be 
classified as highly skilled comprising, inter alia, managers, scientists and researchers, and 
students (cited in Salt, 1999). 
In general, the human capital endowments of new Member States, measured by formal indicators 
such as school enrolment rates and average years of schooling, are higher than those of countries 
with comparable income levels, exceeding those of the Southern EU Member States and almost 
matching those of the other EU Member States. However, formal enrolment rates may not be 
comparable given the fairly different educational systems; moreover, there is evidence that the 
quality of education falls considerably short of average standards in the EU.  
At the risk of over-simplification, it is tempting to speculate based on historical experience about 
a potential polarisation of migrants' jobs along the qualification dimension, with the far bigger 
pole formed by low-skilled, low-paid, flexible and often atypical jobs, probably quite regularly 
also associated with some sort of "brain waste". EU10 nationals currently in the EU15 are 
disproportionately in the medium skill category (up to 60%). In general, lower reservation wages, 
in the sense of accepting jobs of a lower calibre than, in principle, being qualified for, may put 
immigrants on a competitive advantage relative to the indigenous workforce. However, both 
insider-outsider and efficiency wage considerations do suggest that "underbidding" may not be a 
real-world option in many cases.  At the upper end of the job spectrum, one might find a group of 
highly skilled immigrants, comprising for example professional support personnel and 
managerial representatives or scientists, researchers and specialists in various fields, in particular 
where a "common language of understanding" can be easily established.  
A special migrant group is likely to be formed by students from the EU8 receiving tertiary 
education in countries of the EU15. At present, their number is still relatively low. While a trend 
increase in these numbers appears fairly likely, the proportion of foreign students who will enter 
the labour force of their host country during or after their studies is unknown.  
2.2  Economic impact of migration  
2.2.1 The overall gains and pains from immigration 
Immigration, in so far as it constitutes additions to the labour force, increases the amount of 
available labour inputs in an economy, thereby raises potential output and allows for faster 
sustainable growth. However, the positive impact of immigration is perhaps less evident on an 
income per capita basis, given that most of the income gains probably accrue to the immigrants 
themselves. Nonetheless, economic theory suggests that free international movement of labour 
tends to be beneficial because of allocative reasons, at least for the economy as a whole, as the 
migrant goes from a place where he is less productive to a place where he is more productive.   21
 Moreover, with immigrants increasing and/or complementing the skills pool in an economy, 
inflows of foreign workers could well contribute to increasing dynamic efficiency in the host 
economy. Indeed, most studies find a small overall net gain from immigration for the host 
country, the "immigration surplus”, but the benefits are not distributed evenly across the native 
population. 
 
Immigration economics in analytical models 
 
The simplest way of thinking about the economic effects of immigration is in terms of an equilibrium 
labour demand-labour supply model, where immigrants induce an outward shift of perfectly inelastic 
labour supply. 














For an inflow of M foreign workers, output increases by the area NBCL; NDCL is the immigrants' wage 
bill, and the immigration surplus is given by the area of the triangle BCD. Note that a plausible picture 
corresponding to more realistic values would rather put the vertical lines N and L much closer together. 
Indeed, for a 10 percent addition to the initial labour force a typical estimate would suggest an overall 
immigration surplus of about 0.1 to 0.2 percent of GDP (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997). 
While the overall immigration surplus turns out to be fairly small, the distributional effects tend to be 
more significant. In the above model, the native wage bill falls by the area w0BDw1, which accrues to the 
owners of capital together with the immigration surplus. However, to put things into perspective, note that 
assuming an immigration inflow of 10% of the labour force, a typical calculation would suggest an 
income redistribution of about 2% of GDP from native workers to capital-owners. Clearly, when wages 
are sticky downwards, no surplus from immigration will arise, but unemployment will emerge. 
Refinements of the model include the introduction of heterogeneous labour, usually distinguishing 
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, both among natives and immigrants, and lifting the 
assumption of a fixed capital stock. An assessment of gains and losses for the different factors of 
production then requires information on the respective factor price elasticities, on the skill-mix of both 
native workers and immigrants and on how complementary or substitutable are the different groups of 
workers.  
Based on a model of this type, Bauer and Zimmermann (1995) have attempted to gauge the magnitude of 
the gains and distributional effects of migration on native factors of production, applying calibration 
techniques using data for Germany. Their results confirm the general observation that, under reasonable 
assumptions, the overall impact of immigration remains fairly limited, while the distributional effects are 
significantly more pronounced; see below for the order of magnitudes involved. 
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The gains and pains from an immigration inflow equalling 5 % of the labour force 
(Equilibrium model calibrated with German data 1993; in percent of national income) 
 
       Skill-mix  of  immigrants 
      all  unskilled  50:50   all  skilled 
 
Capital               0.71      0.95         1.13 
Labour            -  0.51   -  0.91       -  1.07 
  of  which: 
    - skilled            1.33    - 0.14      - 1.60 
  -  unskilled          -  1.84   -  0.77             0.53 
 
Natives total             0.20       0.04         0.06 
Immigrants             2.18       3.13         3.72 
 
Overall total             2.38       3.17         3.78 
 
Source:  Calculated from Bauer and Zimmermann (1995), Table 6. Income shares are kept fix at 14 % for the unskilled, 56 % for the skilled and 
30 % for capital. The factor price elasticity for the unskilled is assumed to be -0.85, and -0.45 for the skilled. The elasticity of the wage 
of skilled workers with respect to a change in the quantity of unskilled is 0.15, and the respective elasticity for the unskilled wage is 
0.55. The share of skilled workers in the labour force is 72.9 %. 
 
It should be noted, though, that perceptions of the distributional impact of immigration may alter 
drastically when different types of economic models are entertained. Indeed, standard trade theory offers 
the strong presumption that immigration may have no significant effect on income distribution at all, 
because of the output-composition effect in a multi-sector economy (Rivera Batiz, 1983). Putting model 
mechanisms in a nutshell, the increase in labour endowments caused by immigration may simply allow for 
an expansion of the labour-intensive sectors, eliminating any tendency for the wage rate to fall. Clearly, 
though, when market imperfections are taken into account, such as less than fully mobile factors of 
production, income distribution effects are reintroduced into these models. But the theoretical effect of 
immigration on wages is indeterminate in open economy models. 
Theoretical models of competitive labour markets predict that increased labour supply due to 
immigration will, given labour demand, reduce earnings of substitute factors and raise the 
earnings of complementary factors, where complements include capital. But in presence of 
economies of scale, such as in research- or technology- intensive activities, average wages could 
increase. In open economy models, the increase in labour supply is expected to generate other 
economic mechanisms that increase the demand for labour, through the expansion of labour-
intensive industries, so the overall effects on wages and unemployment are ambiguous. 
The key issue for evaluating the labour market effects of immigration is whether immigrants are 
substitutes or complements to native workers. Thus, basically, the consequences for wages 
depend on the relative skill composition of foreign and native labour. The higher the substitution 
between immigrants and natives, the more likely that immigration flows will cause a decline in 
native workers' wages. On the other hand, inflows of immigrant workers that are complementary 
to native workers would, other things equal, increase the productivity of natives and push their 
wages upwards. Economic analysis establishes a direct link between the losses to native 
substitutes and the larger gains to native complements, so little adverse effects of immigration on 
native workers go hand in hand with little native gain from immigration, except when immigrants 
do jobs that no native-born would do at any reasonable wage (Freeman, 2006). 
Assuming that migrants mainly compete with blue-collar domestic labour for unskilled and low-
paid jobs, it is precisely this group of native workers who might see their wage and employment 
opportunities depressed, while the wage and income of complementary factors will move in the 
opposite direction. However, as long as the immigrant flows are not too large, negative impacts 
on native workers are likely to remain rather moderate. Furthermore, as the flows of immigrants   23
are composed of both skilled and unskilled workers, although biased towards the unskilled, and 
insofar as skilled and unskilled workers are complementary, the increased supply of skilled 
workers will raise the demand for unskilled workers and tend to increase their wages somewhat. 
According to standard economic models found in the literature, a typical estimate would suggest 
an overall "immigration surplus" of about 0.1 to 0.2 percent of GDP for a 10 percent addition to 
the initial labour force.
21 The distributional effects tend to be more significant: again, a typical 
calculation for a 10 per cent inflow to the labour force (with a 50:50 skilled/unskilled mix) would 
suggest an income redistribution of about 2  per cent of GDP from native workers to (native) 
capital-owners, with unskilled labour having to shoulder a major share of the burden. Note, 
however, that from an empirical point of view a 10 per cent addition to the labour force 
represents a fairly large increase; in practice, numbers have been much smaller. 
The wage rate effects in standard models are calculated under the assumption that wages adjust 
and labour markets clear. Obviously, when wages do not adjust, unemployment will emerge. 
Indeed, immigrants, especially in Europe, tend to have significantly higher unemployment rates 
than natives, probably reflecting, inter alia, lower wage flexibility and slower speed of 
adjustment in EU economies. 
Immigration may have positive effects on the labour market by relieving the labour shortages in 
certain areas. New jobs can be created, for example in the construction sector, domestic services 
and hotels and restaurants. These jobs may be difficult, with strong seasonal fluctuations or 
generally low paid and would not be offered by natives. The highly skilled immigrants are more 
likely to bring the scientific, technical and innovative skills that expand the production 
capabilities of the economy (Freeman, 2006). They may contribute to the creation of new 
industries and the increase in long term growth through human capital accumulation. Labour 
market efficiency may also increase with immigration, as suggested by Borjas (2001). Indeed, 
immigrants are very responsive to regional differences in economic opportunities. New 
immigrants in the US are found more likely to be clustered in the states where wages are the 
highest for the type of skills they offer, thus "greasing the wheels of the labour market". It is 
typically argued that labour mobility in the EU is too low to function as an adequate adjustment 
mechanism to asymmetric shocks between different regions, especially in the context of 
monetary union. It is certainly much lower than in the US, so immigration could have a potential 
role in improving the efficiency of labour markets by compensating, at least partially, for the low 
mobility of natives. Last but not least, immigrants spend in consumption goods and services and 
related taxes. 
2.2.2 Impact on wages and employment 
The potential negative effects of immigration on wages and unemployment have received a lot of 
attention in the academic debate. A large number of empirical studies examine the impact of 
immigration on the labour market, but the evidence remains inconclusive.  
                                                 
21  Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997), see previous box on "Immigration economics in analytical models".   24
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Source: Commission services, OECD/Sopemi (2006) 
Rough visual inspection of a cross-plot of the overall unemployment rate and the share of 
foreign-born labour force shows little, and if any negative, correlation between these two 
variables. Nine countries out of fifteen record 10 to 12 per cent of foreign-born in the labour 
force, their unemployment rates vary between less than 5 per cent and over 10 per cent. The 
available empirical evidence suggests that the effect of immigration on the unemployment of 
native workers is small. The estimates range from no effect of immigration on unemployment 
to a small effect over time. Negative effects of immigration are generally found in presence of 
very high inflows. Empirical studies based on static labour models find different effects on 
different groups of labour market participants, for example Borjas (1987) work for the US leads 
to the conclusion that immigrants’ main competitors on the labour market are other immigrants 
(Dustmann et al., 2005). Some empirical studies find a positive relation between migration and 
wages of complementary workers. It has to be noted that empirical research is plagued with 
numerous difficulties and that the results depend on many factors, such as the timing of inflows 
or the fact that immigrants can choose destination countries and regions with relatively low 
unemployment rates. Furthermore it is difficult to disentangle the labour market effects of 
immigration from those caused by the different skill levels of immigrants and natives. 
Table 7 Selected studies on immigration, unemployment and wages 
Reference Country  Main  findings 
Card, 1990  US 
The arrival of around 125 000 Cubans, largely unskilled, in 
Florida in May 1985 increased the population of Miami by 
7%. Cubans alone (ie neither other unskilled Hispanics, 
Blacks nor Whites) were significantly affected by the inflow 
of migrants. But the growth of Miami's population was lower, 
indicating a fall from other sources of immigration. 
Altonji and Card, 1991  US 
Very slightly significant positive effect of the migration 
variable on employment, but negative effect on wages 
(elasticity 1.2). 
Hunt, 1992  F 
The repatriation of 900,000 "Pieds Noirs" from Algeria in 
1962 increased the total labour force by some 1.6% per cent. 
A one percentage point rise in the proportion of returnees in 
the labour force reduced regional wages by 0.8 point and 
increased the native unemployment rate by 0.2 point.   25
 
Simon, Moore and Sullivan, 1993 
 
US 
Immigration has no significant effect on the unemployment 
rate. A very slightly positive effect is obtained when changes 
in unemployment are considered over 2 years. 
Muhleisen and Zimmermann, 1994  D  The proportion of foreigners in local industry does not have an 
impact on worker mobility or exposure to unemployment. 
Carrington and De Lima, 1996  P 
The return of 600,000 Angolan nationals to Portugal over 
three years in the mid-1970s, largely in 3 cities, increased the 
local population by some 10%. There is no instantaneous 
effect but a lagged effect equivalent to an additional 1.5% of 
unemployment. 
Diaz-Emparanza and Espinosa, 2000  E 
Immigration has a negligible short term effect on 
unemployment but there is no long-term relation between 
immigration and unemployment. 
Longhi et al., 2004  US, DE, NL, AT, 
Israel, Australia 
A meta-analysis using a sample of 18 papers finds a negative 
but small effect of immigration on wages of natives with 
similar skills (a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion 
of immigrants in the labour force reduces wages by only 0.119 
per cent. 
Aydemir and Borjas, 2006  US 
A 10 per cent labour-supply shift is associated with a 3 to 4 
per cent reduction in wages. Immigration reduced wage 
inequality in Canada and increased it in the US. In Mexico, 
emigration has increased relative wages of workers in the 
middle of the skill distribution, but reduced the relative wage 
of workers at the bottom of the skill distribution. 
 
Borjas versus Card, I  
Does immigration harm the labour market opportunities of the less-skilled natives in the US? 
Borjas (2004) finds that immigration reduced the earnings of native-born men by roughly 4 per cent, by 
increasing the labour supply between 1980 and 2000. He estimates the effect to be larger, of 7.4 per cent, 
for natives without a high school education (who roughly correspond to the poorest tenth of the 
population). Card (2004), on the other hand, looks across major cities and finds that differential immigrant 
inflows are strongly correlated with the relative supply of high school dropouts. Nevertheless, using data 
from the 2000 Census, he finds that relative wages of native dropouts are uncorrelated with the relative 
supply of less-educated workers, as they were in earlier years. At the aggregate level, he finds the wage 
gap between dropouts and high school graduates to remain nearly constant since 1980, despite supply 
pressure from immigration and the rise of other education-related wage gaps.  
There are also dynamic effects which complicate the analysis, such as the assimilation effects as 
immigrants acquire skills and experience in the local labour market, the possible adjustment in 
decisions on human capital investment by the native population and the potential mobility of 
native workers to another location after an inflow of competing workers.
22 
So far, the literature is overwhelmingly based on static labour models. However, the local labour 
markets could absorb an inflow of immigrants in many ways and not only through the adjustment 
of natives’ wages and/or unemployment. The literature has only started to tackle the more 
                                                 
22  However, evidence for the US indicates that the native workers who emigrated from regions receiving an influx of unskilled immigrants 
were predominantly high skilled (Rivera Batiz, 1997).   26
complex dynamic adjustment processes that may occur and the different effects of immigration 
on the whole economy. The impact of past immigration on wages depends on the skills structure 
of the immigrant and native populations, according to Borjas. No obvious impact on native 
unemployment is found; moreover immigration may even have been beneficial as it acts as a 
source of flexibility (Coppel et al, 2001). 
2.2.3 Fiscal aspects of immigration 
An important element in the public debate over immigration is the impact on public finances. 
Immigrants are often seen as a burden for the welfare state, causing additional costs for 
unemployment and social assistance systems, as well as for education and health care systems, 
with these costs, on average, usually not matched by additional tax payments. 
Brücker (2001) shows that in Germany, Sweden and Denmark, the share of foreigners among 
welfare recipients rose from 8.3 per cent to 23.5 per cent over the period 1980 to 1996 whilst the 
share of foreigners in total population increased from 7.2 per cent to 8.9 per cent. In theory, 
skilled workers would select less generous countries, which are less egalitarian and in which 
skills are better rewarded, whilst unskilled workers would select more generous countries.
23 But 
Brücker finds that the higher dependency among immigrants than natives in these countries can 
be explained by the characteristics of immigrants – mainly their education level, age and number 
of children. Temporary immigrants are more likely to leave their family in the source country 
than permanent immigrants, therefore having a lower demand on a number of social welfare 
provisions, notably the public education system. Refugees have a significantly higher welfare use 
than other immigrants. 
Unfortunately, it is quite hard to derive a reliable estimate of the net fiscal contribution of 
immigrants. The impact of immigration on public finances would be positive in the short run, but 
the effect would tend to reverse in the long-run. Results are typically not very robust with respect 
to methodological assumptions; it makes a lot of difference, for example, whether the analysis is 
static or takes life-cycle effects into account, whether the unit of analysis are individuals or 
households, what is taken into account and what not, and so forth.  
Generational-accounting models have been used to estimate the fiscal impact of migration. In 
Italy, 50,000 immigrants per year would reduce the degree of imbalance of current fiscal policy 
by 6 percentage points
24; in Germany (Bonin, 2001), a net annual inflow of 200,000 immigrants 
would reduce the tax burden by 1.1 per cent of GDP. Sinn et al. (2001) use a different 
methodology, calculating the present value for pension benefits and they find that immigrants are 
on average a net burden to the government budget – the burden is higher during their first ten 
years than over their total stay. However, the calculations by Sinn are not very robust with respect 
to small variations in underlying assumptions. A study for the Netherlands by ter Rele (2003) 
finds a negative fiscal impact of immigrants, due to the lagging labour market performance of 
immigrants and the basic public pension provision. In the US additional immigration is found to 
have a positive effect on the government budget only if immigrants are selected by age and skill 
(Storesletten, 2000). A study by the Danish Ministry of Finance (2004) also demonstrates that the 
fiscal impact of migration depends largely on the skill composition of the migrant workers.  
                                                 
23   See box on "Skills, selectivity and the decision to migrate". 
24  This means that, at birth, the present value of net taxes of the average person of the first future generation needed to satisfy the inter-
temporal budget constraint would be 6 p.p. lower than under the hypothesis of no migration. The longer the immigrant stay, the greater their 
contribution to sustainability, see Moscarola (2001).     27
In summary, the evidence on the fiscal effects of immigration is mixed and the results are often 
not very robust. Having this caveat in mind, it is probably fair to say that overall the net 
budgetary impact over the long-run appears to be fairly small. However, geographical 
“clustering” of immigrants could also be associated with a higher burden on “local” budgets. 
Older populations in coming decades 
The EU will undergo unprecedented demographic change in coming decades, see Eurostat (2004). Over 
the period 2004 to 2050, fertility rates are expected to remain well below the natural replacement rate of 
2.1 children per woman, and life expectancy is projected to continue to increase by about one year and a 
half per decade.
25 Net migration flows are projected to hover around 0.2% of the total population.  
The combined effect of these assumptions is that the population in 2050 will be somewhat smaller than 
today, but much older. Under the baseline scenario
26 prepared by Eurostat, the EU25 population is 
projected to increase by 3 per cent until 2025, when it will peak at 470 million. Thereafter, a steady 
decline would occur and, according to the projection, the population in 2050 will be smaller than in 2004, 
at 449 millions.  
According to the projection, the population of working-age would start to decline in 2010 and, over the 
period 2004 to 2050, would drop by more than 15 percentage points, from 307 million in 2004 to 260 
million in 2050. It is only projected to increase in Ireland, Luxemburg, Sweden, Malta and Cyprus. Over 
the same period, the population aged 65 years and above would increase by 58 million people. The old-
age dependency ratio for the EU25, which shows the number of people aged 65 and above relative to the 
working-age population, is projected to roughly double from close to 25 per cent today to over 50 per cent 
in 2050. While the ageing of populations will differ significantly across EU Member States, what is 
common for all is the strong increase relative to current levels, with old-age dependency ratios rising to 
levels well above 50 per cent in some countries. Old-age dependency ratios projected for the EU15 and 
EU10 in 2050 are very similar, with a faster increase projected in EU10 Member States; thus, enlargement 
will not modify overall demographic trends. 
Concerns about the impact of older populations on long-term economic growth and the sustainability of 
public finances have prompted a debate over the potential role immigration could play; see European 
Policy Committee and European Commission (2006). Increased immigration has an immediate impact on 
the size of the population of working-age, provided, of course, net migration continues to exhibit a 
relatively younger age structure than the resident population. In addition, fertility rates among immigrant 
women are often higher than among the resident population which can help boost overall fertility and 
hence long-term population growth. Note, though, that the fertility rates of immigrant women tend to 
converge to those of the native. Furthermore, evidence for Denmark indicates that the immigrant 
descendants tend to have similar fertility rates than native women. Moreover, since immigrants inevitably 
grow old too, the long-run effect on overall demographic structure is significantly less than in the short 
and medium term.  
Immigration already plays an important role in overall population growth. In fact, for the EU as a whole, 
net migration has been a more important source of population growth than natural increase, with a number 
of Member States virtually or entirely reliant on immigration for population growth, see table below. 
                                                 
25   For the EU25, life expectancy at birth for males is projected to increase by 6.9 years between 2004 and 2050. For females, life expectancy 
at birth is projected to increase by 5.4 years, see Eurostat (2004). 
26   EUROPOP2004 Trend scenario, baseline variant.   28
Net migration as a source of population growth, average 
1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-02
BE -41 33 116 31 40 -2 51 47 73
CZ 40 -4 30 4 57 49 -191 -93 -127
DK 2 2 16 11 -84 134 67 66 60
DE 26 19 105 -3 171 72 123 85 185
EE 55 67 53 54 51 30 109 51 -3
GR -120 -126 -100 40 22 55 93 101 103
ES -39 -12 -11 6 -6 -22 38 89 92
FR 42 24 26 15 18 17 9 0 33
IE -72 -122 20 21 -28 232 -15 43 56
IT -25 -29 -19 2 -401 50 263 1950 145
CY -229 -47 27 -27 -26 26 65 58 62
LV 58 57 60 69 52 -13 91 35 24
LT 71 0 2 51 3 2 6 3 588 6 3 9
LU 59 23 100 129 118 85 75 70 64
HU 0 5 -3 -6 115 65 576 -81 -43
MT 443 164 880 34 20 5 29 18 77
NL 2 6 21 34 14 31 38 34 42
AT 2 17 82 1638 90 96 71 51 95
PL -5 -11 461 -16 -7 -27 -15 -49 107
PT 67 291 270 35 0 31 111 84 85
SI -26 13 -11 46 82 -925 106 94 154
SK 1 -14 -220 -6 -16 -12 53 23 371
FI -45 -29 78 -60 14 14 35 29 38
SE 21 37 -13 70 64 66 55 137 107
UK 13 -17 -992 136 162 15 14 46 69
EU25 91 4 4 09 1 2 247 4 1 1 9 7 6
EU15 -7 8 -20 140 13 58 69 189 83
EU10 34 24 130 16 35 -77 83 14 66  
Source: Eurostat 
Looking ahead, however, maintenance of these trends will not be sufficient to offset the expected decline 
in the EU population. According to a population scenario prepared by Eurostat, assuming zero net 
migration, the total population for the EU as a whole would fall by close to 13%, or 58 million people, 
between 2004 and 2050. Only France and Ireland would experience population growth, and population 
would fall most dramatically in Germany and Italy, by more than 20%. Population would fall by around 
15% in Spain and Austria and the remaining countries would experience drops of between 5 and 10%. The 
population in EU-10 Member States would also fall sharply, especially in the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia. The working-age population in the EU25 would fall by about 30% or 87 
million people in the absence of net migration flows. In Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy and the Czech 
Republic the fall would be close to 40%. 
The role of migration in achieving specific population objectives between 1995 and 2050 was the subject 
of a widely noted report by the United Nations (2000). The UN report concluded that keeping old age 
dependency ratios at current levels through migration seems out of reach because of the extraordinarily 
large number of immigrants that would be required. Similar calculations have been performed, for 
example, for Germany arriving at even somewhat higher required migration rates (Bonin, 2001). In a 
scenario with no net immigration, the German population declines by one-third or around 24 million 
people between 2000 and 2050. Assuming the annual net migration inflow remains at its historical average 
of some 200,000 people, the decline in the population is reduced to some 10 million people, or 12 per 
cent. The annual net inflow has to increase to 300,000 people around 2010, and to 500-600,000 people per 
annum from 2030 onwards to maintain a constant. Without any naturalisation, the share of the foreign 
population would increase from 9 to 20 per cent by 2050 if migration remains at historical levels and to 28 
per cent if migration increases to a level which holds the total population constant. With migration at 
historical levels, the old-age dependency ratio is projected to increase from 24 per cent in 2000 to 53 per 
cent in 2050 (and to 65% in case of zero net migration). If migration increases to a level which holds the 
total population constant, the corresponding level will be 43 per cent according to these projections. 
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Pension expenditure and immigration: a rough illustration 
The Economic Policy Committee (EPC) and the European Commission have prepared a set of projections 
for the EU25 Member States covering pensions over the period 2004 to 2050 (see European Policy 
Committee and European Commission, 2006). A projection of the number of people employed was made, 
based on the projection of the population of working-age prepared by Eurostat. Migration has not been 
explicitly modelled, as there are many complex issues involved (such as the assumptions about 
participation and employment rates of immigrants, their productivity, their demographic behaviour etc). 
Still, the sensitivity of future pension expenditure projections to changes in assumptions on employment 
rates was explored, and this sensitivity analysis can be used to roughly illustrate the impact of migration.  
The next table summarises the results of the baseline scenario.  
Baseline scenario: changes in employment and total pension expenditure 
Change
2004 2015 2050 2004-2015 2015-2050 2004-2050 2004 2050 2004-2050
BE 4105 4456 4115 351 -341 10 10.4 15.5 5.1
DK 2695 2740 2548 45 -192 -147
DE 36659 40307 33046 3647 -7260 -3613 11.4 13.1 1.7
GR 4475 4877 3823 402 -1054 -652
ES 17775 20976 16380 3201 -4596 -1395
FR 24601 26261 25450 1661 -812 849 12.8 14.8 2.0
IE 1827 2181 2360 353 180 533
IT 22121 23744 19270 1623 -4474 -2852 14.2 14.7 0.4
LU 191 218 258 27 39 67 10.0 17.4 7.4
NL 8135 8524 8234 388 -290 99 12.4 20.0 7.6
AT 3849 4182 3588 334 -595 -261 13.4 12.2 -1.2
PT 4867 5138 4045 271 -1093 -822 11.1 20.8 9.7
FI 2387 2464 2243 77 -221 -144 10.7 13.7 3.1
SE 4283 4540 4694 257 154 410 12.9 13.9 0.9
UK 28149 29960 28218 1811 -1742 69
CY 344 438 456 94 18 112 6.9 19.8 12.9
CZ 4697 4790 3501 93 -1289 -1196 8.5 14.0 5.6
EE 585 612 475 27 -137 -110 6.7 6.6 -0.1
HU 4010 4143 3276 133 -867 -734 10.4 20.3 9.9
LT 1443 1600 1231 158 -369 -212 6.7 10.4 3.7
LV 1003 1076 791 73 -285 -212 6.8 8.3 1.5
MT 150 177 189 27 12 40 7.4 7.0 -0.4
PL 13894 16075 12814 2182 -3262 -1080 13.9 9.3 -4.6
SK 2240 2545 1884 305 -661 -356 13.9 9.3 -4.6
SI 895 951 738 56 -213 -157 11.0 19.3 8.3
EU25 195380 212975 183625 17595 -29350 -11755 11.9 14.6 2.7
EU15 166120 180567 158270 14447 -22297 -7850 12.0 14.8 2.8
EU10 29260 32408 25355 3148 -7053 -3905 10.9 12.6 1.7
Total pension expenditure
as a % of GDP
Change Employment
number of people in thousands in thousands
 
The number of people employed (according to the European Labour force Survey definition) in the EU25 
in 2050 is projected to be about 11.8 million below the level recorded in 2004. Note that the baseline 
scenario incorporates an annual average net migration inflow of some 830 000 people, or some 40 million 
cumulated over the whole period; moreover, the overall employment rate is projected to rise in the 
baseline to 70.9% in 2050.  
In this scenario, total spending on pensions is projected to rise, on average, by 2.7 p.p. of GDP in the 
EU25. There is a very wide range of outcomes from a projected increase in spending of 12.9 p.p. of GDP 
in Cyprus to a decrease of –4.6 p.p. of GDP in Poland. 
The next table summarises the results of a sensitivity test with respect to higher employment rates. The 
scenario assumes an increase in the employment rate by 1 percentage point over the period 2005-2015 
relative to the baseline, which translates into 2.6 million additional people that are employed on average 
over the projection period. Such an increase in the employment rate, however,  results in only a relatively 
small change in pension expenditure increase: the difference in expenditure increase relative to the 
baseline scenario is of -0.1 p.p. on average in the EU25 (-0.3 on average in the EU10).    30
Higher employment scenario 
 Additional number of employees (in thousands) and change in total pension expenditure (in p.p.) 
Change in difference
expenditure relative to baseline
2005-2015 2015-2050 2005-2050 2004-2050
BE 38 66 59 4.9 -0.2
DK 19 34 30
DE 301 496 448 1.7 -0.1
GR 41 68 62
ES 165 276 249
FR 217 385 345 1.9 -0.1
IE 16 32 28
IT 208 339 307 0.4 0.0
LU 243
NL 61 108 96 7.5 -0.1
AT 30 52 46 -1.4 -0.2
PT 39 64 58 9.5 -0.2
FI 19 32 29 3.1 0.0
SE 32 59 53 0.9 -0.1
UK 220 392 351
CY 365 12.8 -0.1
CZ 38 60 54 5.4 -0.2
EE 587 0.0 0.0
HU 37 59 54 9.1 -0.8
LT 12 20 18 3.5 -0.2
LV 81 3 1 2 1.4 0.0
MT 233 -0.5 -0.1
PL 146 229 209 -4.7 -0.2
SK 21 33 30 -4.7 -0.2
SI 81 2 1 1 6.9 -1.4
EU25 1689 2849 2567 2.6 -0.1
EU15 1408 2407 2164 2.7 -0.1
EU10 281 442 402 1.5 -0.3
Average number of 
additional employees
 
The above scenario of higher employment could be thought of in terms of additional immigration. 
Assuming 50% more immigration per year than in the baseline scenario, a 70% employment rate of 
immigrants and an average presence of 30 years in the labour market would entail 5.6 million more 
employees (immigrants) on average. Thus, according to this simple back-of-the-envelope calculation even 
a significant increase in net immigration relative to the baseline, from about 40 million to 60 million 
cumulated over the period until 2050, would probably shave off little more than one quarter of a 
percentage point of GDP from the increase in total pension expenditures.  
2.2.4 Labour market situation of immigrants in the EU 
Due to data limitations, the situation of non-EU nationals is often used as a proxy to analyse the 
employment situation of immigrants. However, immigrants who are naturalised tend to have better 
labour market outcomes than legal foreign residents and looking at non-EU nationals tends to lead 
towards more negative conclusions. A complementary approach is to look at the situation of the 
foreign-born population (see Münz and Fassman, 2005).  
The participation rates of immigrants in the labour market are generally lower than those of native, 
except in the South European countries where labour migration predominates strongly. In Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands, which traditionally receive high numbers of asylum seekers, the 
participation rates of foreigners are much lower than those of nationals.
27 The gap between female 
immigrants and native-born is wider than for men, with differences of up to 16 percentage points. 
                                                 
27   It should be noted that asylum seekers are often not allowed to work.   31
Table 8  Participation rate, 2004 
Native-born Foreign-born difference
Men
BE 72,9 70 -3
DK 85,1 74,1 -11
DE 79,1 78,8 0
GR 76,1 89,8 14
ES 79 87,8 9
FR 75,1 77,6 3
IE 78,5 77,7 -1
IT 74,5 89,8 15
NL 85 76,2 -9
AT 76,7 79,1 2
PT 79 85,5 7
SE 80,7 74,6 -6
UK 82 78,5 -4
Women
BE 57,4 45,5 -12
DK 77,4 61,9 -16
DE 66,9 54,9 -12
GR 50,6 57,3 7
ES 54 64,2 10
FR 64,5 58,2 -6
IE 57,8 57,3 -1
IT 48,6 55 6
NL 71,2 56 -15
AT 64,1 60,1 -4
PT 66 74,8 9
SE 76,9 68,4 -9
UK 69,6 59,3 -10  
Note:  2003 data for Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
Source:   OECD 
 
The employment rate of immigrants is on average about 6 percentage points lower than that of native 
born. This difference does not tend to disappear once controlling for skill levels and other socio-
economic variables, although the employment rate gap is notably smaller for low-skilled workers. 
Indeed, education and skill levels of the immigrant population in the EU – including country-specific 
skills, such as language – are typically much lower than those of the natives. Moreover, the education 
and professional experience is not easily transferable or recognised into the host country and can 
result in "brain waste". Indeed, indications that certain immigrants tend to be overqualified for their 
jobs point to the risk of discrimination in accessing the labour market.  
Clearly, the situation differs across countries. While the rate of employment for immigrants is close to 
20 percentage points lower than for natives in Denmark, it is similar in Ireland and higher in Spain, 
Greece, Italy and Portugal. The situation has also improved considerably during the last decade, with 
increases in the employment rates of immigrants in all countries except Germany and Austria (where 
employment rates of natives have followed the same trend, although their decrease is much smaller). 
The increase in the employment rate of immigrants has been much stronger than for natives in 
Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal and similar in the remaining countries.   32
Table 9  Employment rates of native- and foreign-born populations, 15-64 years old  
Native-born Foreign-born difference Native-born Foreign-born difference Native-born Foreign-born
BE 56,8 46,3 -11 62 50,2 -12 5 4
DK 73,1 44,6 -29 77,4 59,4 -18 4 15
DE 67,8 62,7 -5 65,8 55,1 -11 -2 -8
GR 54,1 53,7 0 59,3 64 55 1 0
ES 45 45,3 0 60,3 66,2 61 5 2 1
FR 60,1 54,2 -6 63,5 57,1 -6 3 3
IE 52,8 49,2 -4 65,7 64 -2 13 15
IT 50,8 57,9 7 57,4 63,5 67 6
NL 65,6 47,7 -18 75,1 59,1 -16 10 11
AT 68,5 67,7 -1 67,4 61,5 -6 -1 -6
PT 63,2 56,8 -6 67,8 70,1 25 1 3
SE 75,2 53,6 -22 74,3 61,3 -13 -1 8
UK 68,5 58,4 -10 72,4 63,4 -9 4 5
change  1994 2004
 
Note:  Data on the column 1994 refer to 1995 for Sweden and Austria and to 1992 for Germany. 
Source:   OECD 
 
The unemployment rates of immigrants are two to three times higher than those of natives, except in 
recent immigration countries where they are similar. The unemployment rates of immigrants are 
lower than that of nationals only in Greece. Immigrant women have similar or lower unemployment 
rates than men, except in Greece, Spain, France and Italy, where they are much lower, with 
differences between 4 and 12 percentage points.  
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Table 10  Unemployment rates of native- and foreign-born populations, 15-64 years old 
2004 
Native-born Foreign-born R atio
Me n
BE 5,6 15 2,7
DK 4,4 14,4 3,3
DE 10,3 18,3 1,8
GR 6,5 6,7 1
ES 7,8 11,4 1,5
FR 81 3 , 6 1,7
IE 4,9 6,5 1,3
IT 6,4 6,1 1
NL 3,6 10,3 2,9
AT 4,3 11,2 2,6
PT 5,7 9,9 1,7
SE 6,2 13,9 2,3
UK 4,7 7,3 1,5
Wo me n
BE 7,5 15 2
DK 5,2 10,3 2
DE 9,6 15,2 1,6
GR 15,7 18,9 1,2
ES 15,1 17,1 1,1
FR 9,9 17,2 1,7
IE 3,6 5 1,4
IT 10,1 13,1 1,3
NL 4,3 10,6 2,5
AT 4,3 10,7 2,5
PT 7,4 9,6 1,3
SE 5,2 12,2 2,3
UK 3,9 7,3 1,9  
Source:   OECD 
Several empirical studies find relevant “life-cycle effects” (almost exclusively for the U.S., though), 
i.e. over time, as immigrants integrate better in the host countries’ society and improve their 
qualifications, both unemployment rate and wage gaps between immigrants and native workers tend 
to shrink.
28 However, a study for Sweden and Denmark suggests that earlier immigrants do not 
perform better nor earn higher wages than when they were newly arrived.
29 There could be relatively 
less catching up and convergence of second and third generations in the EU than relative to the 
US.  
According to the results of the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), 
immigrant children in some countries lag more than two years behind their native counterparts in 
school performance, and a sizeable gap often remains, even after accounting for socio-economic 
factors (OECD, 2006b). Furthermore, in the majority of countries, at least 25% of immigrant 
students do not demonstrate basic mathematical skills which suggest that the challenges in the 
labour market integration of migrants could persist among successive generations. 
 
                                                 
28   See further the overviews in European Commission (2003) and (2004) and COM(2004) 508 final. 
29   Rosholm (2001). Moreover, the Swedish delegation reports that, in Sweden, foreign born with academic degrees have lower employment 
rates than natives with comparable education; and, when employed, high skilled foreign-born have unqualified jobs to a higher extent than 
native-born. Foreign qualifications in most cases can not immediately be transferred from one country to another and that the proportion of 
highly educated foreign born people with a qualified job during their first years in Sweden will be lower than for natives. But evidence 
shows that these differences exist not only for new arrivals, but also for foreign born who have been in Sweden for a very long time, 
between 16 and 35 years. 
   34
Borjas versus Card, II 
Have immigrants who arrived to the U.S. after the 1965 Immigration Reform Act successfully assimilated? 
Borjas (1987, 1996, 1999) finds that the labour market quality of successive cohorts of immigrants, as 
reflected in education levels, entry wages and rates of assimilation, has declined between the 1950s and 
the 1990s. In 1970, for example, the latest cohort arrived had on average 0.4 fewer years of schooling and 
earned 17 percent less than natives. By 1990, the most recently arrived immigrants had 1.3 fewer years of 
schooling and earned 32 percent less, as compared to natives. He attributes that trend largely to the 1965 
Amendments that abolished quotas and allowed immigration from poorer countries and with lower skill 
levels.  
Card (2004) reviews the success of the U.S.-born children of immigrants. By this yardstick, post-1965 
immigrants are doing reasonably well: second generation sons and daughters have higher education and 
wages than the children of natives. Even children of the least educated immigrant origin groups have 
closed most of the education gap with the children of natives.  
The distribution of foreign employment by industry is converging towards that of the native labour 
force over time (OECD, 2001). Foreign workers, however, still tend to specialise in particular 
industries and occupations, see Table 11. They are over-represented in certain industrial sectors, in 
the sense that they account for a larger proportion of employment in those sectors than they do in total 
labour force. Foreigners are over-represented in the construction sector in most countries and even 
more markedly in services, in particular hotels and restaurants.
30 They are typically under-represented 
in the public sector as well as in the financial sector. There are also wide cross-country differences 
in the industrial distribution of foreign employment. Employment in households and other 
services accounts for 23-33 per cent of total foreign employment in most countries. In Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Austria, more than 20 per cent of foreign employment is concentrated 
in mining, manufacturing and energy. Around 12 per cent of foreign employment in Spain is 
concentrated in hotels and restaurants. In Sweden, over 10 per cent of foreigners employed work 
in the education sector. In Denmark, Sweden and the UK, 15 to 18 per cent of employed foreigners 
work in health and other community sectors. The occupational distribution of immigrants shows 
that they tend to have a greater proportion of blue-collar workers than natives. The proportion of 
foreigners with blue-collar jobs is generally much higher than that in white collar jobs in most 
countries, with the exception of the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium. A higher concentration of 
immigrants in blue-collar jobs is associated with their relatively lower educational levels and the 
problems of skills transferability.  
 
                                                 
30   A shift towards labour intensive industries in certain countries may have an impact on productivity. 
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services Households Administration Other services
BE 1.2 17.3 8.8 14.4 12 4.2 8.8 0.4 2.9 25
DK : 16.2 : 11.9 9.5 5.9 18.5 : : 30.1
DE 1.3 32 6.4 12.9 7.6 3.9 10.1 0.7 3.3 21.9
GR 6.1 16.3 27.3 11.4 9.2 2.7 2.4 13.4 1.4 9.7
ES 6 13.6 16.3 12.2 12 3.6 3.7 12.2 2 18.5
FR 1.9 14.6 10.3 11.9 5.9 6 9.7 5.8 6.8 27.2
IRL 2.2 16.6 8.4 11.5 13.2 6.4 12.5 2.9 25.4
IT 4.5 28.9 11.1 9.7 7.9 2.8 4.6 10.8 2.4 17.4
LU 1 10.5 16 12.2 6 1.9 6.3 4.2 12.2 29.8
NL 1.5 20.4 4.5 15 8.2 5.4 12.2 : 4.6 28.2
AT 1.2 22.3 8.8 14.4 12 4.2 8.8 0.4 2.9 25
SE 0.6 17.2 2.7 12.1 6.6 10.8 18.6 : 3.9 27.5
UK 0.4 11.8 4.3 13.6 9 8.4 14.5 1 5.2 31.9  
Note:   DK and IT 2000-2001 average data, NL 2002 data  
  The numbers in bold indicate the sectors where foreigners are over-represented (i.e. the share of foreign employment in the sector is larger than the share of foreign employment in total employment). 
Source:  OECD/Sopemi (2005, 2006) 
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2.2.5 Impact of out migration on source countries 
The source country incurs production and tax losses as skilled workers emigrate (brain drain). 
However, in some developing countries there are "too many" high skilled workers and a number 
of professionals emigrate because there are no jobs available, so their potential output would not 
have necessarily materialised. In a number of developing countries where public spending is 
higher in tertiary education relative to primary education, the education systems appear better 
suited to the needs of Western economies (Stalker, 1994). Therefore, the impact of the emigration 
of skilled workers is diverse and depends on the situation of the country's education system and 
labour market.  
In theory, migration of skilled workers increases the return to education in sending countries, 
which could lead to higher investment in education, with a positive effect on growth and welfare 
("brain gain"). However, recent research showed that the brain drain can easily be larger than the 
"brain gain" (Schiff, 2005). In particular, in the presence of unskilled migration, which reduces 
the return to education, and “brain waste”, when skilled workers only find a low-quality job in the 
host country, the brain gain is diminished. 
In any case, the source country bears the cost of investment in human capital. It is estimated that 
over one-third of individuals with tertiary education from certain African, the Caribbean and 
Central American countries have emigrated to OECD countries (Ratha, 2003). Although there 
may be remittances, technology and know-how transfers to the sending countries by this 
Diaspora, it appears clear that expatriation on this scale represents a serious loss of human 
capital. This may not only be of concern to developing countries. Recent anecdotal evidence 
points to shortages of specialised and low skilled labour in source countries such as Poland and 
Romania where temporary workers from Ukraine and China are recruited. 
The negative impact of international migration in source countries may well be offset by workers' 
remittances and the possible effects on trade and investment.
31 Indeed most of the gains of 
migration accrue to immigrants themselves (their wage bill) and, through remittances, to their 
families in the source country. They are the second largest source of external finance for 
developing countries, after FDI and often two to three times as large as the official development 
assistance flows (World Bank, 2004 and European Commission, 2005). Low-income countries 
receive larger remittances as a percentage of their GDP than middle-income developing 
countries.  
Remittances raise the income of recipients and contribute to the country's growth through 
investment or consumption. They can constitute an important part of foreign exchange earnings 
of poor countries. Furthermore, remittances are less volatile and less pro-cyclical than other 
private capital flows. They have been rising steadily in the 1990s, even in 1998-2001 when 
private capital flows declined following the Asian crisis. Remittances are more evenly spread 
than other private flows, which tend to concentrate into a few countries. In 2001, the top 10 
recipients of worker's remittances received 60% of total remittances sent to developing countries, 
whereas the 10 countries that received the most FDI concentrated 74% of total FDI (World Bank, 
2003).  
Remittances have played a role in the development of sending countries, such as Italy, Portugal, 
Greece, Spain and more recently Turkey and Mexico (OECD, 2005). Still, these flows are private 
                                                 
31   For example, the net fiscal loss associated with Indian emigration to the US was estimated at 0.24 to 0.58 % of Indian GDP in 2001 but 
remittances amounted to at least 2.1% of GDP that same year. In the case of emigration of low skilled, unemployed workers, the relative net 
gain of remittances would be even higher (Ratha, 2003).   37
transfers and the savings involved belong to the immigrants and their families, who decide on 
their allocation even though governments may offer incentives to migrants to increase the volume 
of remittances or influence its use.  
Finally, migrants returning to their source country bring gains in terms of acquired skills and 
savings and investment.  
3.  Policy approaches 
Two main types of policy approaches can be distinguished, according to whether they deal with 
the stocks of immigrants who are settled, either in regular or irregular situation, or with the flows, 
by implementing overall controls over the entry of new immigrants or through their selection, see 
Graph 4. In essence, almost all countries try to select some immigrants and to keep others away.  
The current stance of national migration policies is towards managing and containing 
immigration flows and addressing the challenges of integration of immigrants present in the 
country. There is growing interest in the selection of immigrants for employment. While recently 
several countries have tightened the asylum and family unification channels, these flows remain 
very important and are admitted on the basis of international agreements or generally recognised 
human rights. The mechanisms to enter for the purpose of employment are only one strand of 
migration policy measures and not the main one in terms of entries of international migrants. In 
2004, migration inflows for work accounted for less than 30% of total entries in the countries for 
which data are available and for about 50% of inflows in Portugal and Denmark, see OECD 
(2006). Family migration, both accompanying family of workers and family reunification, 
continues to dominate also in countries where work immigration has grown in importance in the 
past such as Portugal, Denmark or the UK. 
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The selection of immigrants for employment is mainly geared towards two main areas: 
-  first the recruitment of highly skilled migrants by selective policies to attract/retain these 
workers, mostly for permanent migration. Particular attention is given to international 
students as potential highly skilled workers, who may find it easier to integrate as they 
develop links with the host country during their stay for studying; 
 
-  second, the recourse to temporary, often seasonal, low-skilled immigrants to alleviate 
labour shortages.  
 
Skills, selectivity and the decision to migrate  
Labour demand in the receiving country has an impact on the skill level of immigrants, which leaves some 
scope for selective immigration policies. However, the skill levels of immigrants also depend on their 
country of origin, via positive or negative selection, and on the composition of migratory flows. 
In the analysis of Borjas (1989), based on the Roy model, migration will increase with skill-level (positive 
selection of migrants) if the return to skills is greater in the destination than in the source. On the contrary, 
migration will decrease with skill level (negative selection of migrants) if the return to skills is greater in 
the source. He argues that income disparity can be taken as a proxy for return to skills because return to 
skills is higher in a less egalitarian society and lower in a more egalitarian society. In migration from a 
more egalitarian to a less egalitarian society, the highly skilled are more likely to migrate. In migration 
from a less egalitarian society to a more egalitarian one, the less skilled are more likely to migrate. 
Empirical evidence shows negative correlation between measures of source country income inequality and 
earnings of immigrants in the U.S. 
The effects of income distribution on the decision to migrate are different in the analysis of Oded and 
Taylor (1991). They suggest that migration increases with the relative deprivation of potential migrants in 
the source region and that only the income inequality in the source country matters in the decision to 
migrate. 
The selection of immigrants can be carried out by national administrations through a points 
system; this is what is done in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland. The UK has 
planned the introduction of a points system (in 2007). Otherwise, the selection tends to be done 
by employers, even if governments may impose salary, occupational or educational criteria. In 
that case, immigrants have a job upon arrival.  
Graph 5 Main migration policies to facilitate the migration of the highly skilled 
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In the context of the debate about skills gaps and mismatches there has been a certain revival of 
interest in economic immigration policies to tackle labour market imbalances.
32 Several EU 
countries have already initiated specific programmes or introduced changes in their regulations to 
facilitate access to their labour markets for skilled immigrant workers, in particular for high 
skilled workers such as researchers and software engineers. Some countries are also considering 
selective employment-related immigration policies to alleviate labour shortages, although the 
objectives and procedures may differ from one country to another. 
Spain, Italy and, more recently, Portugal and Germany, had started to advocate selective policies 
similar to those in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. As argued, this European-type selectivity 
takes actually a somewhat different form, in so far that it focuses solely on a system of labour 
immigration quotas in the case of the first three countries. In other European countries such as the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France, no quota has been set. The system of recruiting 
foreign labour is still based on decisions taken principally at national or regional level in the light 
of labour market needs. The labour market situation remains the basic criterion, as well as the 
requirement that the salary be comparable to that for nationals with the same qualifications for 
the job in question. Exceptions do exist however for occupations in the information and 
technology sector in all three countries, and for specialists in the biotechnology, medicine, health 
care and teaching fields in the United Kingdom. In these countries, there are no criteria giving 
preference to one or more nationalities. Depending on the country, the first work permit is usually 
issued for a year and is renewable.  
Table 12 groups more recent measures aimed at highly skilled workers and students or 
researchers into 3 groups according to their broad objective: to attract foreign students or 
researchers; to facilitate the entry of highly skilled and students and to select migrants according 
to their skills. A number of Member States have recently adopted measures to attract foreign 
students or researchers through financial assistance programmes. The entry of highly skilled 
migrants is facilitated mainly through facilitation of the right to work for some skilled 
occupations. Finally, several Member States discuss the introduction of Green card schemes to 
select migrants. A proposal to launch a Community-wide “Blue card” scheme has recently been 
put forward by the Brussels-based Bruegel (2006); the possible design of such schemes has also 
been discussed quite extensively in the context of the EU Policy Plan on Legal Migration. 
Table 12  Selected measures aimed at highly skilled workers and students/researchers 
Country,  
source of information 
Selected measures  Broad objective 
France 
national authorities 
Grants, cooperation with foreign 
Universities and between public 
research centres and firms, 
simplification procedures  
Attract foreign students/researchers 
Denmark 
national authorities 
Extension of the quota for foreign 
students obtaining student/research 
grants in specific areas of study 
Attract foreign students 
Spain 
national authorities 
Financial assistance to receiving 
University/research institution; 
grants to graduates joining 
international organizations 
temporarily 
Attract foreign and native students/researchers 
Belgium 
national authorities 
fellowship scheme for highly 
qualified researchers (for non-EU 
Attract foreign researchers 
                                                 
32   See further HWWA papers commissioned by the European Commission Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities, in particular Papamedetriou (2004).   40
researchers for the moment) and 
financing of 5-year contracts 
The Netherlands  Simplification of admission 
procedures for highly qualified 
workers, earning beyond an annual 
gross salary threshold, no working 
permit necessary and 5-year 
residence permit  
Facilitate entry of highly qualified foreigners 
 
UK Highly  Skilled  Migrant 
Programme, facilitating arrival of 
qualified young people 
Facilitate entry of qualified foreigners 
 
Germany  Permanent residence obtained at 
the outset for highly skilled  
Facilitate entry of highly qualified foreigners 
France 
national authorities 
Easing entry/labour permit 
procedures for foreign executives 




Broadens right to work without a 
work permit for some skilled 
occupations 
Facilitate migration of highly skilled workers 
Greece 
OECD 
Eased conditions to obtain student 
permit 
Facilitate entry of foreign students 
UK  Math, science or engineering 
students can work for 12 months 
after obtaining their diploma 









Quotas for the settlement of non-
EU citizens and their families are 
open exclusively to the highly 
skilled 
Select the highly skilled for permanent migration  
Ireland 
OECD 
Green card established for a list of 
skill shortage occupations, more 
restrictive/extensive for 
occupations in low/high annual 




Planned point system for highly 
skilled immigrants 
Select highly skilled workers 
UK 
OECD 
Planned point system and 
requirement of sponsorship by 
employer for skilled workers with a 
job offer  
Facilitate entry of skilled workers with job offer 
Czech Republic 
OECD 
Programme of Active Selection of 
Qualified Workers, based on a 
points system (this programme still 
concerns a very small number of 
people) 
Select young qualified people  
 
A number of Member States have introduced specific fiscal incentives to attract highly skilled 
migrants, see Table 13.    41
Table 13 Tax measures for foreign specialists 
Country Fiscal  incentives 
France  Reduction of double taxation on stock options, easing of 
fiscal exoneration for immigration bonuses 
Denmark  Preferential tax scheme to attract foreign-based researchers, 
managers and experts 
Sweden  Tax deductions of 25% 
 
However, so far the attempts in a few EU countries to put in place selective measures differ from 
the sophisticated systems that have been in operation for a long time and have been steadily 
adjusted in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In the latter countries, the objectives are broader, 
embracing economic as well as demographic and social aspects. Furthermore, the resources 
implemented both in foreign consulates and/or via digital connections (in Australia, for example), 
are considerable, as well as the consultative procedures at regional and local level and between 
the relevant main partners. 
The Canadian points system 
Research has shown that age, schooling, technical training and proficiency in the host country's language 
enhance the earnings of immigrants. The Canadian points system applies to all skilled or self-employed 
workers wishing to settle in Canada. There are many criteria in the assessment. Points are awarded on the 
basis of 6 decisive factors:  
-  training;  
-  languages known fluently; 
-  professional experience;  
-  age;  
-  whether or not he (she) has signed an employment contract;  
-  evaluation of the applicant's likelihood of adapting to Canadian life (previous stays in Canada, 
spouses' qualifications and training) 
The need for low skilled immigration, typically of a temporary/seasonal nature, is also an issue of 
concern in a number of Member States, in particular in Southern European countries. Member 
States tend to favour temporary immigration for the low-skilled and reserve permanent residence 
to the highly skilled foreign workers. Some Member States have systems to allow applying for a 
work permit based on an offer of employment. Most new measures concern the right for seasonal 
workers to work without work permits for a specific duration, in order to reduce labour shortages 
during specific periods of harvest without introducing a temporary work permit, see Table 14. 
These mostly constitute adjustments to seasonal arrangements in place. Indeed, temporary 
programmes have been growing in the past decade. They concern temporary workers, seasonal 
workers, working holidaymakers (for Australia), contract workers, inter-company transferees of 
workers and managers within multinational firms, and paid trainees.   
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Bilateral agreement signed with Sri Lanka covering the 
movement of up to 1500 caregivers in 2005. 
Poland  Planned bilateral agreement with Ukraine 
UK 
OECD 
A quota to fill low skilled shortages in sectors such as 
hospitals and catering  
UK 
OECD 
Employment sponsorship to meet specific requirements not 
met by UK or EEA citizens  
Ireland 
OECD 
Revised work permit system for occupations outside the 
Green Card lists and for which there is a significant labour 
shortage, based on an offer of employment . 
Finland 
OECD 
Right for horticultural workers to work without permit for a 
period of 3 months 
Greece 
OECD 
New seasonal work permit 
Hungary 
OECD 
New regulations for seasonal work in agriculture 
 
Table 15  Entries of temporary and permanent workers, 1992, 2000-2004, in thousands 
1992 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1992 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
DE 332.6 289.7 330.1 348.4 359.2 358.2 408.9 333.8 373.8 374
FR 18.1 15.4 20.4 23.4 24.7 25.7 42.3 18.4 22.2 20.5
IT 1.7 30.9 30.3 68 77
NL 34.6 38 44.1
SE 19.4 12.7 9.7 9.9 8.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2
UK 27.6 62.3 106.4 63.8 113.1 135.8 149.7
temporary permanent 
 
Note:  data for Italy refer only to seasonal workers  
Source:  OECD/Sopemi 
From a general perspective, selective employment-related immigration policies cannot be 
designed in a simple way and clearly have their limits. Although this should not prevent Member 
States to increase their capacity to forecast skills and labour shortages, it would be illusory to 
think that the future needs of the labour market by sector and occupations can be accurately 
determined, not to speak of successful micro-management via immigration. The migrants most 
likely to help match demand and supply are those adaptable enough to face changing conditions, 
in view of their qualifications, experience and personal abilities. The selection mechanisms must 
be geared towards these would-be migrants and offer them sufficiently attractive conditions. 
Difficulties may arise with respect to identifying “good candidates” for immigration and 
recognising the validity of qualifications and job experience as well as evaluating their linguistic 
skills, while avoiding discrimination in the selective procedure. Moreover, public authorities 
frequently refer to the temporary and even seasonal nature of the immigration they are willing to 
allow, but this is often not realistic. Past experiences of immigration have also demonstrated that 
it is extremely difficult to keep track of the length of stay of migrants and of their geographical 
and occupational mobility and, thus, to sustain temporary immigration schemes 
The limits may also be of an external nature: many countries will probably develop similar needs 
and may thus be competing to attract and retain the same workers. But perhaps more importantly, 
migration policy will always have to take into account other categories and objectives to which 
selectivity may not necessarily apply (admission of asylum-seekers and refugees, family 
reunification and irregular migration). And last but not least, migration policy may be subject to   43
international agreements governing labour mobility. For all these reasons, immigration has become 
a matter of common interest for the Member States and the Commission supports the development 
of a common immigration policy. 
The EU Policy Plan on Legal Migration 
The European Commission adopted in December 2005 a “Policy Plan on Legal Migration”, jointly 
presented by Vice-President Franco Frattini, Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security, 
and Commissioner Vladimir Špidla, responsible for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. 
This plan has been developed in order to comply with a request in the Hague Programme, the EU multi-
annual work programme in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security. The Hague programme explicitly 
asked the Commission to present, before the end of 2005, “a policy plan on legal migration, including 
admission procedures capable of responding promptly to fluctuating demands for migrant labour in the 
labour market”. 
The Policy Plan is the result of a long bottom-up, rather than top-down, process involving all relevant 
stakeholders in the field, notably trade unions, employer’s organisations, governments, European Parliament, 
NGOs and the European Economic and Social Committee. Their input enabled the Commission to present 
its views on how to respond to the economic and demographic challenges ahead of us – and to the 
immigration pressures at our borders – by means of a comprehensive set of measures that should allow for a 
better management of the immigration phenomenon from all its different angles. In order for Europe to truly 
benefit from immigration legal migration must be managed in a coherent, predictable and efficient way. 
Immigration must benefit the European economy, the countries of origin and the individual migrants 
themselves. In this respect, sustained efforts to integrate the immigrants into the labour market and into 
broader society are equally important as clear but flexible rules for entry, stay or re-entry. Indeed, legal 
migration and integration are inseparable and should mutually reinforce each other.  
The Policy Plan is mainly focused on economic migration and aims at giving a clear and complete overview 
of whole range of initiatives – legislative and non – that the Commission intends to take in the next years in 
this field, according to an indicative roadmap covering the period 2006-2009, i.e. the remaining period of 
The Hague Programme. It addresses four areas for action of equal relevance and importance for the coherent 
development of the EU common legal migration policy:  
-  a legislative section to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in 
employment; in particular, four category-specific Directives will govern the conditions and admission 
procedures of third country nationals as highly qualified workers, seasonal workers, inter-company 
transferees, and paid trainees. 
-  actions and policies to foster knowledge building and sharing of information in the immigration field; 
-   policies and founding aimed at supporting and improving the integration of economic migrants and their 
dependents on the labour market and in the host society;  
-  measures aimed at a more efficient management of international immigration flows which need the 
cooperation and the support of the Countries of origin of the immigrants.  
While 2006 will be mostly devoted to carrying out studies on specific issues and discussions on the way 
forward, this preparatory phase will be followed by several concrete initiatives starting from 2007. 
In developing selective employment-related migration policies, one should not nurture the idea of 
micro-planning to match supply and demand across occupations and skills. Certainly, a flexible 
admission system for allowing in foreign (specialist) labour in specific sectors can significantly 
contribute to ease labour market bottlenecks. However, the scope for immigration policies trying 
to pin-point skill shortages appears to be fairly limited and, in any case, unlikely to be applicable 
on a large scale in an easy and quick manner. Rather, harmful policies restricting internal 
mobility and other adjustment mechanisms must be avoided. In general, thus, immigration 
policies should aim to keep the development of foreign workers on an even keel in the medium-
term and to avoid harmful stop-and-go policies.    44
4.  Conclusions  
The picture of immigration which emerges from this note is one in which net migration to the EU 
is on the rise, albeit from a comparatively low level, particularly in Member States like Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Immigration flows have substantially changed, both in terms of their 
countries of origin and destination as well as in terms of their motive. Although the flow of 
asylum-seekers into the EU has increased since 1989, family unification and labour migration 
remain the predominant reasons for immigration, both legal and clandestine. Moreover, 
temporary migration – i.e. cross-border labour flows not leading to permanent settlement in the 
receiving country - has become significantly more prominent. These changes in migration flows 
are altering the composition of the stock of immigrants over time.  
Data restrictions hamper the economic analysis of immigration, partly due to the illegal nature of 
a significant part of inflows. In contrast, migration flows generally followed legal routes in the 
19
th century and they are also extremely well documented. Thus it is easier to analyse the 
economic drivers of migration a hundred years ago than it is today. There is a growing 
divergence between the prominence of the policy issue of international migration and the lack of 
adequate migration statistics. A broad approach is needed when measuring stocks: foreign born, 
foreign born parents and citizenship at birth can also be useful. Development of surveys, in 
particular longitudinal surveys, is crucial to measure the extent of international migration and its 
impact for/of successive cohorts of migrants. Statistical input is crucial to develop and monitor 
immigration and asylum policies, as well as education, employment, social and integration 
policies. 
Overall, the situation of immigrants in the labour market is relatively vulnerable as evidenced by 
low participation rates and high unemployment rates, particularly in Member States which attract 
a high number of asylum seekers. In general, non-EU women are less integrated into the EU 
labour market, with acutely low participation rates and acutely high unemployment rates, even by 
the standards of male non-EU-nationals. The situation of the foreign-born is somehow more 
favourable, pointing at the importance of citizenship in the integration process. Overall, the EU 
appears to be significantly less successful than the US in efficiently absorbing migrants into its 
labour markets, having to cope with a larger share of low-skilled immigrants. Indeed, the EU lags 
far behind the US in attracting highly educated immigrants. While this clearly poses a challenge 
for migration policy, the evidence also suggests that micro planning to match immigration to skill 
shortages is unlikely to be very successful and could even restrict internal mobility and labour 
market adjustment.  
Economic theory and evidence concur that the net gains from immigration are likely to be 
positive in sign and modest in size. While it is possible that a disproportionate share of the costs 
will be borne by certain regions or groups of workers, foreign workers may also relieve labour 
shortages, act as a catalyst for the creation of new jobs and increase labour market efficiency. 
Empirical evidence on the impact of immigration on domestic wages and employment is 
inconclusive, although it appears unlikely that average flows could pose a significant threat to 
wages and employment in the EU. Similarly, the net budgetary impact of immigration appears to 
be fairly small, although the results vary according to how the financial burden is estimated, the 
geographical concentration of immigrants, and whether immigrants are selected on the basis of 
age and skill. 
The enlargement of the EU from fifteen to twenty five Member States has seen a significant 
increase in the number of EU8 citizens working in the EU15 countries, often on a temporary 
basis. However, the evidence so far and available projections for the future do not suggest   45
massive east-west net flows of labour which would put the absorption capacity of receiving 
countries’ labour markets under an unbearable stress test, even if the movement of workers 
becomes completely unrestricted. In fact, the impact of migration may pose a bigger challenge in 
some of the source countries in the form of labour shortages in specific areas and a net loss of 
human capital.  
The evidence on the link between immigration and ageing populations suggests that while net 
inflows of immigrants can partially offset demographic developments, immigration could not on 
its own solve the problems linked to ageing. Population ageing affects migrants themselves, as 
they get older and their fertility patterns tend to resemble those in their host country. Thus even 
somewhat higher net immigration would not dispense policy makers from implementing the EU’s 
internal structural reform agenda to cope with the impact of ageing populations. Clearly, better 
functioning labour markets will also be conducive to a smooth integration of a growing number 
of immigrants from non-EU countries in the future. 
Obviously, migration scenarios and calculations are somewhat mechanistic and fairly sensitive to 
assumptions such as age and family structures of newly arriving immigrants. But perhaps more 
importantly, immigration policy cannot easily be fine-tuned to reach precise demographic 
objectives due to difficulties in controlling the volume and composition of net migration. The 
difficulties in managing migratory inflows are all too-well known, limiting in practice the ability 
to quantitatively target net immigration flows. Moreover, even while policy may have some 
control over the level of immigrants, it has little or no control over emigration.  
Moving from population considerations to labour market scenarios for the future workforce with 
a view to identify macro labour shortages to be filled by migratory inflows is of course even more 
complicated, both from a purely methodological and a political point of view. Demographic 
developments interact with policy reactions and behavioural responses, all of which affect the 
size and structure of the labour force in a complex way. Thus, any estimate of future “labour 
force gaps” to be filled by migrant workers crucially depends on the question to what extent the 
existing labour force potential can be mobilised. And, clearly, labour market participation of 
migrants has to be considered as well. In consequence, all these factors have to be taken into 
account simultaneously to obtain a better understanding of the potential contribution of migration 
to mitigate the labour market impact of demographic change. However, efforts to identify 
precisely future labour market needs in terms of immigration flows and to fine–tune immigration 
policies accordingly appear rather limited.  
Finally, all Member States have in place a wide variety of policies to manage migration. While 
this provides ample room to learn from each other and to identify what works and what doesn't 
work in migration policies, it also creates a need to deal with cross-country spill-over effects and 
to correct potential co-ordination failures. The latter may arise, for example, from a lack of co-
operation/competition for selected/highly skilled migrants or the legal implications of 
regularisation programmes. Spill-over effects may stem from the single market with free 
movement of labour within the EU and they underpin the further development of a common 
approach to immigration into the EU.  
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5.  Annex    




Launched in December 2005, LABREF is an on-line database providing information on enacted 
policy measures which are intended to have an impact on labour market performance in the EU. 
The database provides information on the design of reforms, their scope and durability. LABREF 
is organised around nine policy fields, one of which is immigration policies. Under this heading, 
the database covers the following types of policy measures: 
 
•  Border controls, encompassing measures related to the entry, stay and access to the 
labour market; 
 
•  Selective immigration policies, including quota systems aimed at the recruitment of 
foreign workers, the easing of recruitment policies for highly skilled or for specific 
occupations as well as bilateral labour agreements on seasonal or temporary workers; 
 
•  Measures to facilitate the labour market integration of immigrants, ranging from 
ALMPs to the recognition of formal education attainments and the entitlement to 
benefits/social assistance programmes targeted at immigrant workers 
 
The structure of the database enables the user to analyse policy measures by areas of intervention 
and specific design characteristics. LABREF will be updated annually and there are also plans to 
backdate the information. So far, the database contains a summary overview of reforms enacted 
by EU Member States in 2004. The following brief illustrates how LABREF can be used as an 
instrument for tracking trends in EU Member States' migration policies.  
 
1. Determination to manage migration flows 
 
As a response to increasing migration pressure, many EU Member States have set migration 
control high on their political agenda, both at national and European level. Combating illegal 
immigration is seen as a priority.  
 
Spain, a country currently having one of the highest migration rates in Europe, established an 
extraordinary process of legalisation in 2005. Registered immigrant workers holding a work 
contract with a minimum duration of 6 months could obtain residence permits. In Greece, 
immigrants with an expired temporary permit were allowed to submit their renewal request. In 
both cases, the objective of the intervention was to combat undeclared work, gain better control 
over the immigrant population and facilitate their social and economic development. 
 
Intra-EU migration has also been the subject of discussion. With the exception of the UK, Ireland 
and Sweden, all old Member States introduced transition periods for citizens from EU-8 upon the 
EU enlargement to 25 Member States in 2004. Limitations were imposed to the free movement 
and access to the labour market for citizens from these countries.  
 
The UK opened its labour market from 1 May 2004 and introduced a Worker Registration 
Scheme (WRS). Under the scheme, citizens from EU-8 who took up work in the UK needed to 
register with the authorities. The purpose of the scheme was to allow the Government to monitor 
the participation of workers from EU-8 in the UK labour market.    47
2. Growing interest in selective immigration policies  
 
While toughening controls over migration flows, EU Member States also show increasing interest 
in developing policies to promote selective immigration policies. Several Member States have 
eased their legislation to facilitate the entry of highly skilled workers. Special programmes, 
simplified administrative procedures and bilateral agreements are used to further this aim.  
 
Facing a shortage of graduates in the fields of physical science, engineering and mathematics, the 
UK has introduced a Science and Engineering Graduates Scheme (SEGS) which authorises 
foreign graduates in the relevant disciplines to remain in the country for 12 months to pursue their 
careers. A similar measure has been enacted in Germany, where students who complete their 
studies may remain in Germany for one year after graduation to seek employment. Moreover, 
Germany welcomes self-employed foreigners provided they are anticipated to have an impact on 
the economy and employment.  
 
The Netherlands also seek to attract skilled workers. According to a new regulation, workers with 
a labour contract and an annual gross salary of at least € 45.000 now only need a residence permit 
and no longer a separate work permit. In Spain, new measures aim at linking legal immigration 
flows to the dynamics of the labour market. A new system of entry for immigrants should make 
more room for individual recruitment of high-skilled workers and for programmed recruitment of 
'quota' workers required in specific sectors. 
 
3. Measures to encourage the labour market integration of immigrants 
 
As regards measures to facilitate the integration of immigrants, reforms were focused on efforts 
to curb discrimination and promoting integration of immigrants in the labour market.  
 
With the aim of promoting equality in the workplace, Ireland introduced new employment rights 
which should prevent indirect discrimination and broaden the scope for positive action. Similarly, 
Finland has reinforced legal protection against discrimination based, among others, on ethnic 
origins. The legislation covers in particular access to social services and requires each authority 
to draw up a plan to foster ethnic equality. 
 
To facilitate the participation of immigrants into the national labour market, some Member States 
have formulated active labour policies aimed specifically at this group.  
 
Denmark introduced special coaching schemes and entrepreneurial centres in neighbourhoods 
where the majority of the population is of foreign background. In France, the use of 'reception 
and integration contracts' has been extended to all of the country. The contracts provide newly 
arrived immigrants with language classes and social assistance in order to assure a successful 
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